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JUDICIAL TAKINGS OR DUE PROCESS?
Eduardo M. Pefialverf & Lior Jacob Strahilevitzt
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department
of Environmental Protection, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the judici-
ary from declaring that "what was once an established right of private
property no longer exists" unless the property owner in question receives just
compensation. In this Article, we delineate the boundaries between a judicial
taking and a violation of the Constitution's due process protections. The
result is a judicial takings doctrine that is narrower and more coherent than
the one suggested by Stop the Beach.
Our argument proceeds in two parts. The first is a conceptual section
that explains what factors are relevant to determining whether a judicial
action diminishing a private property interest is a judicial taking or some-
thing else. In our view, where a judicial decision intentionally seizes private
property to achieve a legitimate public end, the Takings Clause is an appro-
priate framework for evaluating the constitutionality of the State's action.
The Due Process Clause is the more appropriate doctrinal pathway where the
judiciary does not intend to appropriate a private owner's property rights on
the State's behalf, or where the diminution of private property rights results
from a judicial action that serves no legitimate public purpose. By clarifying
the boundaries ofjudicial takings, we also hope to shed light on the constitu-
tional foundations for numerous state-court doctrines concerning the retroac-
tivity of new property rules. The second section articulates a novel
functional argument, which suggests that creating liability for judicial tak-
ings may cause litigants to underinvest in high-quality legal representation,
which will in turn increase the likelihood of judicial mistakes and contribute
to the destabilization of existing entitlements. This phenomenon prompts us
to argue that cases in which the underinvestment incentives are most pro-
nounced should be litigated under the Due Process Clause, but cases where
repeat play or the government's involvement as a litigant mitigates the un-
derinvestment problem represent more appropriate vehicles for judicial tak-
ings treatment. What rides on the distinction between judicial takings and
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due process violations? Under our approach, judicial takings cases should
be (a) easier to win than due process cases, (b) more likely to result in dam-
ages remedies than injunctive remedies, and (c) more amendable to attractive
"comparative fault" inspired solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environ-
mental Protection,' a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the judiciary from
declaring that "what was once an established right of private property
no longer exists" unless the property owner in question receives just
compensation. 2 In the process, Stop the Beach became the first Su-
preme Court decision to embrace the doctrine of 'judicial takings."
In this Article, we ask readers to assume the correctness of the plural-
ity's conclusion that there is such a thing as ajudicial taking.3 In light
of that assumption, our goal is to delineate the boundaries between a
judicial taking and a violation of the Constitution's due process pro-
tections. Along the way, we will show how the doctrine ofjudicial tak-
ings might feasibly be constrained in a manner that does not prevent
courts from making necessary clarifications about the scope of
entitlements.
1 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
2 Id. at 2602.
3 We harbor some doubts as to the desirability of recognizing a judicial taking.
Much of the analysis we provide in this Article, which suggests that the universe ofjudicial
takings should not be large, can be used by those seeking to defend a more maximalist (or
arguably minimalist) proposition, which is that there ought to be no such thing as ajudi-
cial taking.
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This effort at boundary drawing is an academic exercise with real-
world significance. Stop the Beach resulted in a heated split between
the four Justices in the plurality, who wanted any judicial abrogation
of existing property rights to be dealt with via the Takings Clause, and
Justices Anthony Kennedy and Sonia Sotomayor, who agreed with the
plurality that the Constitution constrained the judicial redefinition of
property rights but thought that cases like Stop the Beach ought to be
decided under due process analysis.4 This dispute between Justices
Antonin Scalia, for the plurality, and Kennedy, in partial concurrence,
over the appropriate doctrinal hook for dealing with judicial abroga-
tion of existing entitlements extended into further disagreement over
the appropriate remedies in those cases. 5 Once a court finds a judi-
cial redefinition of property unconstitutional, should owners receive
damages or injunctive relief? We will begin by describing those two
core disagreements, along with the relevant intricacies of Florida real
property law, which were at issue in Stop the Beach.
The story of Stop the Beach actually begins in 1927. That was the
year Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig anchored Murderers' Row, the most
feared lineup in baseball history. More obscurely, it was the year of
Martin v. Busch, a Florida Supreme Court opinion holding that when
the State creates new dry land out of what had previously been pub-
licly owned submerged land, the new land belongs to the State, not to
the private owner of the dry land that had previously abutted the
water's edge.6 This was the result notwithstanding the common-law
doctrine of accretion, which gives the private owner of adjacent dry
land ownership over any submerged lands that become dry lands as a
result of gradual recessions of the water's edge.7 The result in Martin
mapped on to the way the common law had long treated avulsions,
instances in which the water suddenly recedes to create new dry land.8
Such newly created dry land has for generations belonged to whoever
owned the soil while it was still submerged, and Martin held that the
State's causal role in the avulsion made no difference. 9
The facts of Stop the Beach were very close to those of Martin. In
Stop the Beach, the city of Destin, Florida sought to restore 6.9 miles of
beach that had been eroded by multiple hurricanes. 10 It proposed to
do so by dredging submerged sand and dumping it onto the spot
4 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2597 (plurality opinion); id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment).
5 Id. at 2607 (plurality opinion); id. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
6 112 So. 274, 287 (Fla. 1927).
7 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2598.
8 Id.
9 Martin, 112 So. at 287.
1o Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.
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where the water met the sand." In some places, this process would
widen the beach by approximately seventy-five feet toward the water. 12
The State would own this newly recreated beachfront, and the private
property owners whose land previously extended to the high-tide line
would now have the publicly owned sand lying between their property
and the water's edge at high tide.1 3 The private property owners ar-
gued that the widening of this beach deprived them of their right to
access the water directly from their property and the right to expand
the size of their beachfront property via accretions, asserting a viola-
tion of the Takings Clause.' 4 After the Florida courts ruled against
the property owners, they sought certiorari in the U.S. Supreme
Court, asserting that the Florida courts had engaged in a judicial tak-
ing by abrogating the property owners' rights to direct water access
and accretion. 15 Critically, none of the state judicial opinions cited
Martin v. Busch.
Thanks in part to an amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General,
which underscored the importance of Martin,16 the Supreme Court
realized that the Florida courts had not changed the property owners'
rights at all, since the Stop the Beach plaintiffs had never had any enti-
tlement to prevent the State from widening the beach and claiming
the widened portion as state property.' 7 With Justice John Paul Ste-
vens recused, all eight remaining Justices agreed that in light of the
answer to this property question, there was no judicial taking in Stop
the Beach.'8 For Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
that was that, and the opinion need not have reached the constitu-
tional question of whether there was any such thing as a judicial tak-
ing.' 9 It was enough to say that the facts before the Court presented
no judicial taking.20
Justice Scalia, writing for Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Clar-
ence Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito, saw things differently. He
wrote that the Constitution does protect property owners against tak-
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 2600-01.
16 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Stop the
Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 3183079.
17 See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2611 ("[I]f an avulsion exposes land seaward of
littoral property that had previously been submerged, that land belongs to the State even if
it interrupts the littoral owner's contact with the water.").
18 Id. ("Thus, Florida law as it stood before the decision below allowed the State to fill
in its own seabed, and the resulting sudden exposure of previously submerged land was
treated like an avulsion for purposes of ownership. The right to accretions was therefore
subordinate to the State's right to fill.").
19 Id. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
20 Id.
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ings effectuated by the judiciary in the same way that it protects them
against takings perpetrated by legislatures or executives. 21 In the plu-
rality's view, "[i]t would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial
decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat."22
Thus, the plurality concluded, " [i]f a legislature or a court declares that
what was once an established right of private property no longer
exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State had physi-
cally appropriated it or destroyed its value by regulation."23
While the Breyer concurrence was short and minimalist, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence (written on behalf of himself and Justice
Sotomayor) was not. Elaborating on an approach that he had advo-
cated in earlier Supreme Court concurrences, 24 Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that the most appropriate framework for deciding cases in which
a judicial decision resulted in a litigant's loss of an existing entitle-
ment would be through the Due Process Clause of the Constitution,
not the Takings Clause.25 But in Stop the Beach he did not want to
decide the question of whether the Takings Clause might ever pro-
hibitjudicial conduct that the Due Process Clause permits. 26 The plu-
rality fired back, accusing Justice Kennedy of advocating the improper
importation of separation-of-powers considerations into due process
jurisprudence, suggesting that Kennedy's approach is directly con-
trary to existing precedent, arguing that Kennedy's favored methodol-
ogy would repeat the mistakes of the Lochner era by protecting
economic liberties via substantive due process, and pointing out that a
substantive-due-process approach would raise many of the practical
objections that Justice Kennedy launched against the judicial takings
approach. 27
The plurality and the Kennedy concurrence also differed sharply
over the question of remedy, a second key point and one closely re-
lated to the question of whether the takings or due process approach
is superior for the sort of injury in Stop the Beach. Prior to Stop the
Beach, the law had for decades stated the remedy for a takings viola-
21 Id. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
22 Id. at 2601.
23 Id. at 2602.
24 Id. at 2614-15 (citing his previous opinions in E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498
(1998) and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)).
25 Id. at 2618 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
26 Id. Justice Kennedy also noted, "If and when future cases show that the usual prin-
ciples, including constitutional principles that constrain the judiciary like due process, are
somehow inadequate to protect property owners, then the question whether ajudicial de-
cision can effect a taking would be properly presented. In the meantime, it seems appro-
priate to recognize that the substantial power to decide whose property to take and when
to take it should be conceived of as a power vested in the political branches and subject to
political control." Id.
27 Id. at 2605-06 (plurality opinion).
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tion rather clearly: where the government violates the Takings Clause,
the remedy is compensation for the period the violation is in place, 2 8
but when its action deprives an owner of property without due pro-
cess, compensation is not sufficient and the government action must
be invalidated. As the unanimous Court put it in Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.:
The [Takings] Clause expressly requires compensation where gov-
ernment takes private property "forpublic use." It does not bar gov-
ernment from interfering with property rights, but rather requires
compensation "in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting
to a taking." Conversely, if a government action is found to be im-
permissible-for instance because it... is so arbitrary as to violate
due process-that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compen-
sation can authorize such action.2
9
The Supreme Court's decision in Stop the Beach threw the remedial
question into a state of uncertainty, at least where judicial takings are
concerned. According to Justice Kennedy's concurrence, a hypotheti-
cal jurisdiction whose new property rules were deemed a judicial tak-
ing would usually have to pay damages but could in limited
circumstances face a choice between paying damages and reembrac-
ing the content of their earlier property precedents:
It appears under our precedents that a party who suffers a taking is
only entitled to damages, not equitable relief .... It makes perfect
sense that the remedy for a Takings Clause violation is only dam-
ages, as the Clause "does not proscribe the taking of property; it
proscribes taking without just compensation."
It is thus questionable whether reviewing courts could invali-
date judicial decisions deemed to be judicial takings; they may only
be able to order just compensation .... If a single case were to
properly address both a state court's change in the law and whether
the change was a taking, the Court might be able to give the state
court a choice on how to proceed if there were a judicial taking.
The Court might be able to remand and let the state court deter-
mine whether it wants to insist on changing its property law and
28 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
29 544 U.S. at 543 (2005) (quoting First English, 483 U.S. at 315 ); see also Timothy M.
Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 252 (2011) (noting
that it "is sounder to analyze claims of improperjudicial property declarations under a due
process theory" because it would "provide some semblance of stability to property own-
ers"); Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and
Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. Rzv. 379, 436 (discussing the "practical considerations" that
support the remedy of invalidation, rather than compensation, under the Due Process
Clause).
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paying just compensation or to rescind its holding that changed the
law. 30
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion brushed aside Justice Kennedy's con-
clusion that compensation would be the primary remedy for judicial
takings. As the plurality saw it, a compensation "remedy is even rare
for a legislative or executive taking, and we see no reason why it would
be the exclusive remedy for a judicial taking."''s The plurality contin-
ued, noting that if the Court "were to hold that the Florida Supreme
Court had effected an uncompensated taking in the present case, we
would simply reverse the Florida Supreme Court's judgment that the
Beach and Shore Preservation Act can be applied to the property in
question." 32 If the plurality's approach to judicial takings is adopted
by a majority in a subsequent case, then the usual remedy in ajudicial
takings suit would be the reversal of a lower court ruling that had tried
to abrogate a preexisting entitlement.3 3 Note in particular the deep
tension between the Stop the Beach plurality and the Lingle Court's
unanimous 2005 opinion.
If the remedies for both Takings Clause and Due Process Clause
violations are identical-invalidation of the offending state action-
then properly allocating claims between the two clauses arguably be-
comes a lower-stakes affair. Eliminating the traditional remedial con-
sequences of the distinction would not, however, completely vitiate
the significance of the choice of clauses. For starters, Justice Scalia
did not take the position that damages would be unavailable for judi-
cial takings violations. He only said that the usual remedy in the case
of a judicial taking would be to invalidate the judicial decision giving
rise to the violation. If a State created a mechanism to provide com-
pensation for owners who suffer judicial takings, the Takings Clause
would certainly permit the State to opt for the damages remedy. 34 On
30 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985)).
31 Id. at 2607 (plurality opinion).
32 Id.
33 For an illuminating discussion of the remedial question and an argument for why
the plurality gets the better of Justice Kennedy on the issue, see D. Benjamin Barros, The
Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 944-48 (2011).
34 Oregon's Measure 37 might constitute a useful data point concerning how local
governments may respond when given a choice between compensating affected landown-
ers and rescinding a regulation. That law required land-use regulators to either compen-
sate owners when new land-use restrictions reduced the value of their land (to any extent)
or to exempt the complaining landowner from the new rule. In the few years the law was
in effect, governments invariably opted to exempt the landowner from the regulation. See
JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, GEORGETOWN ENVrL. LAW & POLICY INST., PROPERTY VALUES AND ORE-
GON MEASURE: EXPOSING THE FALSE PREMISE OF REGULATION'S HARM TO PROPERTY OWNERS
37, at 5 (2007), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/GELPIMeasure3 7 Re-
port.pdf) (citing Measure 37 Database, PORTLAND ST. U., http://www.pdx.edu/ims/mea-
sure-37-database (last updated Dec. 12, 2007)). Part of the problem, however, may have
2012]
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the other hand, a state action that deprives an owner of property with-
out due process must be invalidated and (if possible) the property re-
stored to its owner, without regard to the payment of damages. 35
The core dispute between Justices Scalia and Kennedy is the cen-
tral question we address in this Article: Assuming that there should be
a remedy of some sort for instances in which courts abrogate preexist-
ing private property rights, when does it make sense to proceed via a
judicial takings remedy, and when does it make sense to resolve the
dispute using a due process framework? In answering this question,
we will begin to describe some of the decisive institutional considera-
tions that should affect the analysis and flesh out how the law may
develop in the coming years. The remedial question, which repre-
sented the second main bone of contention between the Scalia plural-
ity and the Kennedy concurrence, will be a critical component of that
analysis.
Our Article proceeds as follows. Part I identifies the salient tex-
tual, structural, and precedential arguments that might help us distin-
guish between those courts' interferences with property rights that
implicate the Takings Clause and those that implicate the Due Process
Clause. The key factor in our framework is intent to subject private
property to public use. Where a judicial decision intentionally seizes
private property to achieve a legitimate public end, the Takings
Clause is the best framework for evaluating the constitutionality of the
State's action. Due Process is the more appropriate doctrinal pathway
where the judiciary does not intend to appropriate private owner's
property, as well as when the diminution of private property rights
results from a judicial action that serves no legitimate public purpose.
Other relevant factors in our analysis include whether the private
property in question is retained for a public purpose and whether the
been that the law required compensation to come from a fund specifically designated for
the purposes of Measure 37 compensation. In William Fischel's account of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, he observed that, after the State of South Carolina was required to
purchase David Lucas's waterfront property as a result of his successful inverse condemna-
tion action, see 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992), the State opted to sell the property for develop-
ment rather than keep it in undeveloped-as it had forced Lucas to do. See William A.
Fischel, Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
CHOICE 549, 552 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004). Fischel views this
as evidence of the cost-internalizing effects of compensation on government actors. See id.
Vicki Been favors a more political interpretation of South Carolina's behavior, noting that,
by the time it was forced to purchase the property from Lucas, the State had already signifi-
cantly eased the regulatory regime that had motivated Lucas's original lawsuit in response
to pressure from waterfront owners in the wake of the destructive Hurricane Hugo, a cate-
gory 4 storm that severely damaged homes along the South Carolina coast in 1989. See
Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient
Regulation?, in PROPERlry STORIES 299, 320-23 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds.,
2d ed. 2009).
35 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).
[Vol. 97:305
JUDICIAL TAKINGS OR DUE PROCESS?
judiciary and another branch of government have coordinated their
actions in an effort to circumvent the Takings Clause's limitations on
legislative and executive action. The main thrust of this Part is to lay
the foundation for our discussion ofjudicial takings by spelling out in
general terms the proper scope of the Takings Clause and in the pro-
cess correct misimpressions that have developed in the takings litera-
ture and in some of the case law.
Part II then presents the core original thesis of the Article, pro-
viding a functional account that further helps reinforce the signifi-
cance of the distinction between judicial takings and due process
violations. On our account, there is a key distinction between judicial
decisions that diminish the value of private property and executive or
legislative decisions that do the same. Because of the adversarial na-
ture of the judicial process, private property owners themselves shoul-
der more of the blame for ajudicial decision that diminishes the value
of their private property than would be the case if a legislature or
agency diminished the value of their property. On this logic, the avail-
ability of judicial takings causes of action act as a form of mandatory
insurance, one that may diminish the incentives of property owners to
invest in high-quality legal representation at the early stages ofjudicial
proceedings. Such underinvestment may create negative externalities
in the form of destabilized property doctrines as cases work their way
from trial to appellate courts. Because we argue that repeat play di-
minishes the underinvestment problem, we argue that cases involving
repeat-player litigants are more appropriately treated as judicial tak-
ings cases, whereas those involving non-repeat-player litigants ordina-
rily would implicate the Due Process Clause. This functional analysis
dovetails nicely with our discussion of the proper scope of the Takings
Clause in Part I, because the biggest repeat player of them all in prop-
erty litigation is the State. Thus, for both conceptual and functional
reasons, property cases in which the State is a party should be under-
stood to lie at the heart of the category of judicial takings, properly
defined. (As we will argue in Part II, however, the category ofjudicial
takings includes some cases in which the State is not a party.)
Part III identifies some of the implications of treating a subset of
disputes as judicial takings and others as due process cases. In our
view, judicial takings cases should (a) be easier to win than due pro-
cess cases, (b) result in damages remedies rather than injunctive rem-
edies, and (c) lend themselves to attractive "comparative fault"
inspired solutions. By comparison, claimants litigating due process
cases challenging judicial acts would face an uphill battle to prevail,
with a series of remedies largely injunctive in nature and a landscape
where doctrines like comparative fault would be unavailable to the
courts. The universe of judicial takings claims will be confined, but it
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will hardly represent a null set, as other commentators have advo-
cated. 36 Although we draw on existing precedents to show why such
different implications may flow from the divergent work that the Tak-
ings and Due Process Clauses are doing in the Fifth Amendment, our
discussion in this Part is as much normative as positive. Having shown
that there may be sensible ways to differentiate among different types
of cases, we defend the view that those differences are justifiable and
important.
I
THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL TAKINGS
Let us begin by considering two boundary dispute hypothetical
scenarios. Assume that each of them involves a comparable economic
loss.
Private Boundary Dispute.3 7 A and B own neighboring residential
properties. In the course of making several improvements to her
property, B built a set of concrete steps and a concrete walkway that
inadvertently encroached roughly two feet onto A's parcel. When A
discovered the encroachment over twenty years later, he sued to
have the steps and walkway removed. B claimed that she had ac-
quired the land under encroachment by adverse possession. A 1921
decision by the New Jersey high court had held that, in order to
adversely possess, a claimant must show that she knew she was occu-
pying land that did not belong to her. The trial court followed that
precedent and, because the evidence showed that B did not know
she was encroaching, entered judgment for A. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court decides to repudiate its 1921 decision and follow the
majority of American jurisdictions, which hold an adverse posses-
sor's subjective state of mind to be irrelevant to her claim. As a con-
sequence, B prevails.
Public-Private Boundary Dispute?8 Hughes traces title to her ocean-
front parcel in Washington State to an original purchaser from the
federal government prior to Washington's statehood. In its 1889
Constitution, Washington State asserts ownership of "the beds and
shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the
line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and flows,
and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the
banks of all navigable rivers and lakes."3 9 The State has interpreted
36 See, e.g., Walston, supra note 29, at 379, 435-36 (arguing that there should be no
such thing as a judicial taking, and all cases involving judicially imposed diminutions in
property rights should be considered under a due process framework).
37 The facts of this hypothetical are based loosely on the New Jersey case of Mannillo
v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969).
38 The facts of this hypothetical are based on Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290
(1967).
39 Id. at 296 (quoting WASH. CONST. of 1889, art. XVII, § 1).
[Vol. 97:305
JUDICIAL TAKINGS OR DUE PROCESS?
this language to confer on it ownership of accretions to waterfront
parcels, in contradiction to the common law, which (at the time of
the state constitution's adoption and in most jurisdictions since)
grants ownership of accreted land to the upland owner. Hughes
sues Washington State, claiming she owns the accretions adjacent to
her waterfront parcel. The state trial court rules that federal law at
the time of the original grant governs the question and rules for
Hughes. On appeal, the state supreme court holds that Washington
State law determines the scope of property rights within the state
and adopts the state's interpretation of the 1889 constitutional pro-
vision to Hughes' land. Consequently, it rules that the State of
Washington owns the accreted land.
In both hypotheticals, a landowner loses property, but in each case
does it make sense to say that the State (acting through the courts)
has taken property for public use without just compensation? Embed-
ded within this question are two distinct, though related, issues. First,
in what sense are courts properly understood as agents of the State
such that judicial resolution of ostensibly private disputes constitutes
an action on behalf of the State? Second, when is it appropriate to
describe a court deciding a case in a way that impairs the property
interests of one of the parties as taking property for public use so as to
require just compensation by the State?
The first question raises tangled issues surrounding the doctrine
of "state action." "Takings" are something that the State does to prop-
erty owners. The Stop the Beach plurality is committed to the idea that
a judicial decision constitutes state action to the same degree as an
action by any other branch of government. 40 But, without substantial
qualification, this simple equation leaves important questions unan-
swered. Does the plurality mean to suggest that any judicial applica-
tion of state property law constitutes state action? If so, that would
constitute a significant expansion of the state-action doctrine, in effect
extending Shelley v. Kraemer4 ' to a very broad range of property cases.
It would mean, for example, that any enforcement of a homeowners'
association rule depriving an owner of preexisting rights-say, by ban-
ning smoking in common areas-might constitute state action and
could give rise to a takings suit.
42
It seems unlikely that the plurality intended such a dramatic shift
in the law of state action. A more likely possibility is that the Stop the
40 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
41 See 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (holding that state-court enforcement of racially restric-
tive covenants constituted state action for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
42 Robert Ellickson advocated just such a "private" Takings Clause in a 1982 University
of Pennsylvania Law Review symposium. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners As-
sociations, 130 U. PA. L. Rv. 1519, 1533 (1982).
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Beach plurality envisions a distinction between judicial lawmaking (i.e.,
law changing) and judicial law enforcement. The enforcement of an
existing property law does not deprive someone of property he al-
ready had-even if it results in the owner losing a piece of property he
previously possessed. This sort of judicial action merely activates ex-
isting limitations already embedded within their title. 43 But when
courts change the law, they are acting as lawmakers. And it is only as a
lawmaker altering existing property entitlements that the State can
possibly take property from an owner for public use.44
A. The Constitutional Text
Having narrowed the potential reach of the judicial takings analy-
sis to situations in which judges change the law, the second question
becomes the more challenging one. When does a judicial change in
the law amount to a taking of property? Is it always the case that if
someone loses property to which she was previously entitled because a
court has changed a property rule, then the State (through the court)
has taken her property for public use within the meaning of the Tak-
ings Clause? Recall that there is certainly language in the Stop the
Beach plurality suggesting as much. "If a legislature or a court declares
that what was once an established right of private property no longer
exists," the plurality says, "it has taken that property, no less than if the
State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by regula-
tion."45 This simple equation of a loss due to a change in property
rules with a "taking for public use" is only superficially appealing, a
point driven home by the first hypothetical, the adverse possession
case. When a state court loosens the rules governing adverse posses-
sion and applies the new rule to the parties before it, the consequence
is that property that would not have changed hands under the old
rule goes to the adverse claimant. The original owner has clearly lost
property in the way apparently envisioned by the Stop the Beach plural-
ity. The question is whether the mere fact that an owner suffers a loss
at the hands of the State's courts means the State has "taken" it "for
public use" in a way that makes it analogous to the exercise of emi-
nent domain and therefore triggers the compensation requirement of
the Takings Clause.
43 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (observing that a
regulation that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use would not constitute a
taking if it "inhere [s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership").
44 See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENV,-L. L. 1, 3 (2003)
("A viable regulatory takings claim assumes that the government has acted to prohibit
some activity that once was allowed, or at least had not been explicitly prohibited.").
45 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2602 (2010) (plurality opinion).
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Answering this question requires a broader consideration of ex-
actly how, and against what, the Constitution protects private prop-
erty. There is a tendency among commentators-understandable as
much for historical reasons as hermeneutic ones-to try to make the
Takings Clause an ultimate and all-purpose constitutional guarantor
of private property rights. 4 6 But the Constitution protects private
ownership in a number of overlapping and complementary ways. In-
sofar as the Framers saw "faction" as a grave threat to property rights,
we can understand many of the structural constraints on majoritarian
politics built into the Constitution-the independent judiciary, the
Senate, the Electoral College, the federal system, to name just a few-
as property protections. As Alexander Hamilton put it in Federalist No.
85:
The additional securities to republican government, to liberty, and
to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under con-
sideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of
the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on
the ambition of powerful individuals in single States who may ac-
quire credit and influence enough from leaders and favorites to be-
come the despots of the people; in the diminution of the
opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of the Con-
federacy would invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive
military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars be-
tween the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of
a republican form of government to each; in the absolute and uni-
versal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in the precautions against
the repetition of those practices on the part of the State govern-
ments which have undermined the foundations of property and
credit, have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of
citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostration of
morals.
4 7
Even confining our focus to the textual provisions in the Constitution
that explicitly protect property rights, we see a similar multiplicity of
strategies. The Fifth Amendment itself has two property clauses, after
all. The Takings Clause protects owners from having their property
"taken for public use" without 'just compensation." 48 And the Due
46 In the 1980s, a number of prominent conservative lawyers seized on the Takings
Clause as the lynchpin for a concerted strategy of impact litigation to attack and rein in
what they viewed an overreaching regulatory state. See, e.g., CHARLEs FRIED, ORDER AND
LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REvOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 183 (1991).
47 THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 505-06 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n. Classics
2009); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra, at 47 (James Madison) (arguing that the
regulation of competing property interests "forms the principal task of modern legisla-
tion"); Eduardo Mois6s Pefialver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. Rrv. 2182, 2252-53
(2004) ("[T]he mechanisms for protecting property owners from abusive government reg-
ulation should not be primarily judicial, but rather structural and political.").
48 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Process Clause protects them against being "deprived of... property,
without due process of law."49 Perhaps the difference between taking
property and depriving someone of property is akin to the distinction
between picking someone's pocket and, having found someone's wal-
let, returning it to the wrong person. If the government imposes a
loss without the intent to harness private property to accomplish a
public purpose, it has not "taken" that property "for public use,"50
though it might still have violated the owner's constitutional rights.
Although these two provisions have frequently been muddled to-
gether by courts and commentators alike, 51 grammatically they oper-
ate independently of one another and the Supreme Court
understands them to protect owners against different kinds of govern-
ment harms.5 2
To D. Benjamin Barros, the textual argument is a decisive reason
for concluding that cases like our adverse possession example, where
the courts hold that Blackacre really belongs to private actor A, de-
spite earlier suggestions in the case law that it ought to belong to pri-
vate actor B, cannot be judicial takings. 53 While we agree with
Barros's fundamental result in this particular hypothetical, we arrive
there for somewhat different reasons. Assuming the textual approach
is the right one to use to discern the meaning of the Takings Clause, it
is worth underscoring that the Fifth Amendment is written in the pas-
sive voice, not the active one: "[N] or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation. '54 The Constitution's
choice of passive voice obscures the identity of the taker, suggesting
that the use need be public, but the taker need not. If the Constitu-
49 Id.
50 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (quotations omitted).
51 See Walston, supra note 29, at 379-80 (discussing the merger of substantive due
process and regulatory takings).
52 See Lingte, 544 U.S. at 542-43 (distinguishing between the interests protected by the
Takings and Due Process Clauses, with the former protecting owners against bearing a
disproportionate burden of the costs of an otherwise valid regulation and the latter pro-
tecting owners against regulations that are invalid because they are irrational or arbitrary).
53 See Barros, supra note 33, at 922 ("Focusing on both the front and back ends of the
transfer provides a natural demarcation of which types of transfers are subject to the Just
Compensation Clause and the Due Process Clause. Both private-public and private-private
transfers imposed by a government actor 'deprive' owners of private property and are sub-
ject to the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Only private-public transfers, in con-
trast, 'take' property and are subject to the requirements of the Just Compensation
Clause."). But see Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 260-62 (concluding that private-to-private
transfers of entitlements may be judicial takings under the Stop the Beach plurality ap-
proach). There are certainly cases in which courts have found takings liability when a local
elected body transfers a common-law entitlement from one private party to another. See,
e.g., Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 322 (Iowa 1998) (holding that a
county's invocation of a state Right to Farm statute, which immunized a farmer against the
possibility of a nuisance suit by neighbors, constituted a "flagrantly" unconstitutional
taking).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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tion had been written to say, "nor shall the State take private property
for public use" or "nor shall private property be taken and retained for
public use," then Barros's argument would become decisive, at least in
textual terms. In our view, the sort of but-the-language-could-have-
been-clearer move that Barros makes, or that we just offered in re-
sponse, is an unsatisfying way to interpret a constitutional text. Even
beyond that, it seems counterintuitive to deem the text of the Takings
Clause decisive when the case law interpreting it has deviated so
sharply from both the Clause's plain meaning and its original under-
standing.55  The textual considerations strike us as, at most,
suggestive.
B. Intent
Given the indeterminacy of the textual arguments, it is worth
turning to a body of precedent that confronts a question very much
like the takings/due process issue posed in Stop the Beach, but which
benefits from having been open to consideration for a longer period
of time and with less ideological valence. This body of case law, which
discusses the connection between the regulatory takings inquiry and
the purposive reading of the Takings Clause we are proposing, con-
cerns the boundary between government takings, for which the consti-
tution requires compensation, and government torts, for which it may
not. In identifying State deprivations of property as "takings," cases
discussing this boundary principle consistently emphasize the impor-
tance of the government's intent to appropriate the property in ques-
tion for some public purpose or, alternatively, the fact that the
government benefits from the property owner's loss in a way that sug-
gests the possible presence of such intent. Where the government de-
prives the owner of property through negligent acts not apparently
calculated to derive some benefit from the owner's loss, however,
lower courts have often found the government's conduct to fall be-
yond the reach of the Takings Clause.56
In 2003, for example, the Federal Circuit considered a claim by a
property owner who argued that the construction of a post office up-
hill from his property damaged his land by increasing the runoff from
55 SeeJohn F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doc-
trine, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1252, 1252-57 (1996); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early
Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1099-102
(2000); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 791-92 (1995).
56 See, e.g., Green Int'l, Inc. v. State, 877 S.W.2d 428, 434 (Tex. App. 1994) ("The
rationale for [the] scienter requirement is the idea that negligence by government agents
confers no benefit on the public."). Some state constitutions expressly protect property
owners from damage to their property by the State, as well as from takings. See Robert
Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just
Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REv. 57, 118-20 (1999).
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the uphill parcel.57 The court developed a test for marking the
boundary between "takings for public use" and tortious deprivations
of private property not compensable under the Takings Clause. The
test focuses on the government's intent to take property for its own
purposes or, where evidence of specific intent is lacking but the prop-
erty owner's loss is the predictable consequence of the government's
conduct, on the government's de facto appropriation, such that the
government benefits at the private owner's expense.5 8 "[A] property
loss compensable as a taking," the court said, "only results when the
government intends to invade a protected property interest or the as-
serted invasion is the 'direct, natural, or probable result of an author-
ized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by
the action.' 59
A similar issue arose in Nicholson v. United States, a case arising in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 60 In that case, the Court of
Claims was confronted with the argument that the United States had
taken the plaintiffs' property in violation of the Takings Clause when
the levies built by the Army Corps of Engineers failed, causing wide-
spread flooding in and around New Orleans.61 The court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment, noting that "[t] he key
to distinguishing a taking from an incidental injury [not compensable
under the Takings Clause] is the presence on the part of the Govern-
ment of an intent to appropriate. '6 2
As we will argue below, keeping the notion of due process and
takings separate helps to clarify the proper reach of a doctrine of "ju-
dicial takings. ' 63 Our position is not based on an overriding commit-
ment to textualism or originalism as modes of constitutional
interpretation. Instead, as we will argue, the use of multiple mecha-
nisms for constitutionally protecting property not only maps well onto
legal distinctions that have helped separate takings from torts, but also
provides a normatively resonant alternative to trying to turn every un-
wise government act into a taking. Distinguishing between the Tak-
ings and Due Process Clauses is consistent with the text of the
Constitution, but it also provides a richer conceptual vocabulary for
evaluating constitutional property claims and helps courts tailor the
57 Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
58 See id. at 1355-56.
59 Id. at 1355 (quoting Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707,
709 (Ct. Cl. 1955)).
60 77 Fed. Cl. 605 (2007).
61 Id. at 606-07.
62 Id. at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Berenholz v. United States,
1 Cl. Ct. 620, 627 (Cl. Ct. 1982)).
63 See discussion infra Part III.
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most protective remedies (injunctive relief) to the most serious viola-
tions of private property rights.
Much of the voluminous academic commentary on the Takings
Clause has focused on the important questions of when property has
been "taken."64 More recently, scholars have turned their attention
towards the meaning of "public use. '6 5 But, perhaps for understanda-
ble reasons, few have focused on the word linking these two important
and contentious concepts. In defining the boundaries of the concept
ofjudicial takings, however, the word "for," with its implication of pur-
posefulness, may help to shed some light on the Takings Clause's
meaning.
This is not to say that the question of intent has been wholly ab-
sent from the Takings Clause discussion. In an insightful article, Ron-
aldJ. Krotoszynski argued that intent to appropriate was a touchstone
for distinguishing regulatory takings from due process violations. 66
And, in its 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme
Court expressed a renewed interest in a condemning body's intent.67
Prior to Kelo, it had been common for courts and commentators to
treat the "public use" language in the Takings Clause as a (concededly
64 The academic commentary on the takings question is voluminous. Mercifully, its
growth has slowed in recent years. The consensus among most scholars is that the Su-
preme Court's takings jurisprudence is a "muddle." See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 44, at
1-2 (calling regulatory takings law "famously incoherent"); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice
and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 279 (1992) ("[T]akings doctrine is a
mess."); Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive
Jurisprudence, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2158, 2169-70 (2002) (likening attempts to interpret the
Takings Clause to the "physicist's hunt" for the elusive quark (citation omitted)); Carol M.
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL.i. L. REv. 561,
561-62 (1984) (describing Takings Clause jurisprudence as "[b]y far the most intractable
constitutional property issue"); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1077-97 & n.2
(1993) (reviewing the state of takings jurisprudence and collecting sources).
65 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM.
L. REv. 1412 (2006); Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REv. 877; James W. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, "Public Use," and New Directions in
Takings Jurisprudence, 2004 MICH. ST. L. Rev. 845; William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of
Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REv. 929; Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 934 (2003); Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent
Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 1
(2006); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61 (1986).
66 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of
Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REv. 713, 718 (2002) (arguing that
intent to expropriate ought to be a requirement for establishing a regulatory taking). Our
approach differs from Krotoszynski's in that he defines the requisite intent far more nar-
rowly than we do. For example, he distinguishes between an intent to appropriate and an
intent to regulate. See id. at 719. On our approach, however, the intent to regulate is
consistent with an intent to appropriate if the regulation deprives an owner of a property
right that he previously possessed in order to accomplish some valid public end. In this
sense, our approach is more consistent than Krotoszynski's with the scope of existing regu-
latory takings doctrine.
67 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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weak) limitation on the government's power of eminent domain. 68 In
Kelo, however, the Court seemed to go farther, emphasizing that for
an explicit use of eminent domain power the condemnor's actual in-
tent must be to foster a "public use" (which courts have long under-
stood to broadly encompass any legitimate "public purpose") in order
to constitute a valid exercise of that power. 69 Thus, as the Court said,
a condemnor exceeds the limits of the Takings Clause when it takes
property "under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual
purpose was to bestow a private benefit. '70
Importantly, a use that is not public is invalid, even if accompa-
nied by just compensation. One way of looking at this feature of "pub-
lic use" inquiry is to treat it as a limitation on the ends that can be
pursued through the use of eminent domain. Such a gloss makes
sense where there is no dispute about whether a taking is occurring.
But, in addition to a limit on ends, there is another way of looking at
the relevance of intent in the "public use" inquiry, one that becomes
more salient when there is a debate about whether a taking has oc-
curred. This is to understand the requirement of intent not just as a
restriction on ends but as also at least partially definitive of means.
That is, property is "taken for public use" when there is intent notjust
with regard to the public ends being pursued but also with respect to
the means being employed-the appropriation of property in the ser-
vice of those ends.
This notion of the Takings Clause as only applying when certain
intentions are present can help to make sense of the Fifth Amend-
ment's textual distinction between two distinct categories of property
losses. The first, broader category is "deprivations," which seems to
encompass any loss of property imposed on owners by deliberate ac-
tions of the State, without any regard to purpose. 71 This category is
68 See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954); see also Claeys, supra note 65, at 878 (discussing the "strong
impression" made by courts and commentators that the "public use" language of the Tak-
ings Clause had little influence on legislatures).
69 See 545 U.S. at 477-78.
70 Id. at 478.
71 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). Justice Stevens would
broaden the "deprivation" category even further and jettison the requirement that the
State's action be deliberate:
"Deprivation," it seems to me, identifies, not the actor's state of mind, but
the victim's infringement or loss. The harm to a prisoner is the same
whether a pillow is left on a stair negligently, recklessly, or intentionally; so
too, the harm resulting to a prisoner from an attack is the same whether his
request for protection is ignored negligently, recklessly, or deliberately. In
each instance, the prisoner is losing-being "deprived" of-an aspect of
liberty as the result, in part, of a form of state action.
See id. at 340-41 (1986) (Stevens,J, concurring in thejudgment); see also AJ VAN DER WALT,
CONSTrrUTIONAL PROPERTY LAw 123-28 (2005) (discussing a similar-though not identi-
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defined in part, though not exclusively, by the impact on the owner,
not by the reason for the State's action. Some losses (deprivations)
may be legitimate, whether or not owners are compensated, but some
of them-those deprivations that occur without due process-are
deemed illegitimate, perhaps even if compensation is provided. The
second, narrower category, properly understood as a subset of the
first, occurs when property is "taken for public use." To fall within
this subset, the State must purposefully employ a particular means-
taking of property-in the service of public end. The presence of
these intentions marks off the "takings" subset of the broader category
of property losses due to intentional actions of the State (depriva-
tions), a subset that the Fifth Amendment explicitly declares to be
legitimate, provided that just compensation is paid.72
The fact that the Constitution expressly permits intentional dep-
rivations-so long as just compensation is paid-might at first seem
odd. We are accustomed to the notion that intentionally imposing a
loss is somehow more blameworthy than doing so accidentally. Why,
then, does the Constitution permit the intentional harm of taking
property upon the payment of compensation while at the same time
categorically barring some potentially unintentional deprivations-
those that occur without due process? The puzzle is deepened by the
wide consensus, among courts and commentators, that 'just compen-
sation" systematically undercompensates most expropriated property
owners. 73 In other words, the Constitution seems to empower the gov-
ernment to inflict significant harm on property owners but only if it
does so with intent.
The puzzle is more apparent than real. The key is to take a closer
look at the nature of the government intentions encompassed by the
Takings Clause and, with that understanding in hand, revisit the no-
tion of due process. The kind of government action that falls within
the ambit of the Takings Clause is the intentional use of private prop-
erty for the public's good, provided that just compensation is paid.
Although what counts as a public use has historically been very broad,
it excludes (as the Court made clear in Kelo) the taking of property
cal-distinction between "deprivation" and "expropriation" in the South African
Constitution).
72 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37 (2005).
73 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 183 (1985); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (6th ed. 2003);
Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REv. 741, 755 (1999); Lee Anne
Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 957, 962 (calling the notion
that "just compensation" undercompensates a "truism"); Christopher Serkin, The Meaning
of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 677, 678-79
(2005). But see Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. Rv. 101 (2006) (questioning the conventional view that most owners are un-
dercompensated when their property is taken by eminent domain).
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with the animating purpose of benefitting some favored private
party.7 4
The Due Process Clause has a broader and more foundational
focus. It protects property owners against lawless and arbitrary treat-
ment at the hands of the State.75 Historically, that protection has
been understood to have both a substantive and a procedural dimen-
sion. In its procedural dimension, the Due Process Clause requires
that the State deprive owners of property only through procedures
that provide owners with notice and an opportunity to be heard.76
How much notice and what kinds of opportunity to be heard depends
very much on the circumstances of the loss being inflicted. As the
Supreme Court put it in Mathews v. Eldridge, the process that is due is
determined by weighing "the private interest that will be affected by
the official action" against the Government's asserted interest, "in-
cluding the function involved" and the burdens on the Government
of requiring more process. 77 Where, as it is in the 'judicial takings"
context, the questions relate to whether it is permissible to change a
legal rule and then apply it retroactively to existing entitlements, this
procedural aspect of due process has obvious implications, both for
the propriety of retroactive application of new rules and, as we will
see, for the need to preserve a functional adjudicative process for judi-
cially assessing disputed property entitlements.
In its substantive dimension, this category of arbitrary state con-
duct marks the outer boundaries of the State's legitimate power to act
at all. It has traditionally been analyzed in terms of the suitability of
the government's ends and the fit-as a matter of practical reason-
ing-between those ends and the means the government has chosen
to pursue them.78 The question of ends is nearly identical to the
"public use" inquiry under the Takings Clause. 79
74 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-78.
75 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
76 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
77 See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), quoted in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529
(2004).
78 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541-42.
79 One possible difference is that, since Kelo, the "public use" question focuses on the
government's actual ends-that is, the goal it was actually trying to achieve by taking prop-
erty. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478, 479-81 ("Nor would the City be allowed to take property
under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a pri-
vate benefit."); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) ("Once the object is
within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent
domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end."); Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1984). Conversely, under due process (and
equal protection) analysis of property regulation since the end of the Lochner era, the ques-
tion has been whether there is some conceivable public purpose that would justify the
regulation. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring); FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1993); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1955). But, as Justice Kennedy observes in his concurring opinion
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The restriction of state actors to public ends prohibits the State
from abdicating its obligation to act in the public's interest by making
itself the agent for a private actor's private good. This notion that
valid lawmaking must be undertaken in pursuit of the public (and not
some private actor's) good has deep roots in the Western legal tradi-
tion. As John Locke explained, "the power of the society, or legislative
constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther than
the common good."80 Echoing earlier discussions by Aristotle and
Aquinas,81 Locke took the position that the entire lawmaking and law-
enforcing apparatus of the State must "be directed to no other end
but the peace, safety, and public good of the people."8 2 This require-
ment that law be oriented towards the common or public good has
been a fixed point within the American legal tradition. As Justice Sa-
muel Chase famously explained in Calder v. Bull:
An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a
rightful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law in
governments established on express compact, and on republican
principles, must be determined by the nature of the power, on
which it is founded. A few instances will suffice to explain what I
mean.... [A] law that makes a man ajudge in his own cause; or a
law that takes property from A, and gives it to B: It is against all
reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such
powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done
it. 8
3
in Kelo, the difference is more apparent than real. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The consideration of conceivable public purposes does not mean that the
pursuit of private purposes is to be tolerated in the due process analysis. Instead, it reflects
a strong presumption in favor of the public-spiritedness of public actors. Where the evi-
dence shows that a regulation challenged under the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses was in fact motivated by the narrow desire to confer a private benefit without at the
same time achieving any public good, the regulation will run afoul of the Constitution. See
id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446, 447, 450
(1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533, 536 (1973)).
80 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERA-
TION 156 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
81 For Aristotle, for example, orientation towards the "common good" versus the pri-
vate good of those with political power is what, at the most basic level, distinguishes legiti-
mate political institutions from deviant ones. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. III, ch. 6, § 9, at
97-99 (R.F. Stalley ed., Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (c. 350 B.C.E.);
RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 385-86 (2002). Similarly, Aquinas con-
sidered orientation towards the common good a fundamental requirement for legality. See
2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Ia-Ilae, q. 95, art. 4; q. 96, art. 1 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (c. 1265-1274) ("[L]aw
should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens."
(emphasis omitted)).
82 LOCKE, supra note 80, at 157.
83 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis omitted).
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A law that is enacted merely with the end of enriching B at the ex-
pense of A, with no apparent regard for the public's good, is not a
legitimate legal act. Viewed from within this long tradition requiring
that law be oriented towards the public good, the government's inten-
tion in the case of the taking for private use is far worse than its inten-
tion to take property in the public interest, and it makes sense to
demand the more inflexible remedy (prohibition of the action rather
than just compensation) for the former. Illegitimate state action does
not come within the ambit of the Takings Clause. And excluding oth-
erwise illegitimate acts from the logic of the Takings Clause makes
normative sense since the remedy for violation of the clause is the
payment of compensation. Government acts that are not oriented to-
wards the public good, however, fail the most basic test of legality and
are not licensed even upon the payment of compensation.
The notion that a taking (and, therefore, a judicial taking) is an
intentional deprivation aimed at putting a piece of private property to
public use requires some additional clarification about what consti-
tutes an intentional taking. In this regard, it is important to distin-
guish between two categories of judicial action: on the one hand,
intentionally submitting property to public use; and on the other, inci-
dentally imposing property losses on particular owners as a result of
changes in property law (albeit changes intentionally undertaken, as
all public actions must be, for public reasons). Both sorts of losses
result from judicial actions that are motivated by a desire to achieve a
public purpose. But are they the same? In the former case, the pri-
vate property lost by the owner is intentionally harnessed towards a
public end. In the latter case, the property loss is simply an unin-
tended consequence of a change in the law where it is the change in
the law itself that fosters the public end. We can isolate the first cate-
gory by asking whether a particular property owner's loss is itself a
means of achieving the relevant public end. When this is the case, the
legal change is properly evaluated under a judicial takings analysis.
The second category is different. If the owner's loss is, from the
narrow point of view of achieving the public end, a matter of indiffer-
ence, then the judge has not appropriated the owner's property for a
public use, and the loss falls beyond the reach of the judicial takings
analysis. The conclusion that the property was not appropriated for
public use, however, does not mean that the owner is without constitu-
tional recourse. It simply means that, to make a claim, the owner
must show that the property loss was not consistent with due process.
This means that the owner must show that there is no reasonable ex-
planation for why this change in the law must be implemented in a
way that imposes a loss on this owner. The most obvious justification
for the State to offer will be the costs of administering the new rule in
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a way that avoids the loss. That answer, however, will not always be
credible, for reasons we will discuss. Moreover, if the owner can pre-
vail, the law will forcefully protect the owner's entitlement by mandat-
ing an injunctive remedy-the restoration of the property-rather
than permitting the State to proceed with the deprivation upon the
payment of just compensation.
C. Public Use and Intent
Courts and commentators alike have often said that a taking for a
private purpose is ruled out by the public use language of the Takings
Clause itself.8 4 This narrow identification of the "public use" restric-
tion with the Takings Clause appears to rest on a conceptual error. As
the public use language makes clear, and as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes observed in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the Takings Clause
assumes that any action covered by its compensation obligation is, in
the first instance, a legitimately public act.85 A better way to describe
the situation of takings for private use is that they do not fall within
the scope of the State's power to act at all and, for the same reason,
violate due process. Taking A's property in order to enrich a well-
connected private party is simply not a legitimate public act, irrespec-
tive of the payment to A of just compensation.
But this sort of misuse of the public power for private ends does
not exhaust the due process analysis. Even the pursuit of a valid gov-
ernment end can be arbitrary-and therefore violate due process-if
it imposes a loss on a property owner where it is easy to avoid the loss
and where failing to avoid it in no conceivable way assists the State in
pursuing its legitimate public ends. While the "ends" part of the due
process analysis rules out certain intentions (such as the bald pursuit
of private gain) as inconsistent with the exercise of lawmaking power,
the "means" part of the analysis requires from the State a minimal
degree of competence and care in the pursuit of its ends. The re-
quirements of competence and care do not prohibit the government
84 See, e.g., Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241 (discussing the requirements imposed by the "Pub-
lic Use Clause"); Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference
to Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn's Atlantic Yards Project, 42 URB. LAw. 287, 331
(2010) ("The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that private
property may not be taken by the government except for a 'public use' and upon 'just
compensation."'). But see Rubenfeld, supra note 64, at 1079-80 (criticizing the traditional
interpretation of the "public use" language as a limitation on the takings power rather than
descriptive of the sorts of government actions that require compensation to property
owners).
85 See 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The protection of private property in the Fifth
Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be
taken for such use without compensation."); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 543 (2005) ("[T] he Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted
in pursuit of a valid public purpose.").
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from imposing losses on owners. Instead, they simply demand that
the government avoid-where feasible-needless losses and demand
that the State be able to give some account of how its failure to avoid a
particular owner's loss relates to the government's ability to pursue its
valid ends. If the State cannot give such an account, then the way in
which it is pursuing a concededly public end imposes an arbitrary loss
on the property owner, and the remedy is to require the State to pur-
sue the end in a way that does not impose the needless deprivation.
The distinction between a taking for public use and a deprivation
without due process does not mean that a property owner must chal-
lenge a government action as either one or the other. It does mean,
though, that a deprivation without due process cannot simultaneously
be a violation of the Takings Clause.8 6 Moreover, since the takings
inquiry operates on the assumption that due process requirements
have been satisfied, the due process inquiry is, in a sense, logically
prior to the Takings Clause analysis.8 7 This in turn suggests that,
when confronted with a claim that a state action is either a violation of
due process or of the Takings Clause, a court should consider the due
process challenge first; only if that challenge fails (i.e., if the court
thinks the government's action is consistent with due process) should
the court move on to consider the takings challenge.
D. Intentionality and Coordination
To summarize the discussion so far, the Takings Clause addresses
situations in which the government intentionally diminishes a private
owner's property rights to achieve a legitimate public end, permitting
the government to exercise this power but potentially requiring the
payment of just compensation. The Due Process Clause covers a
broader range of state conduct insofar as it addresses itself to all other
losses imposed by state action on private owners. The State violates
the Due Process Clause when it inflicts those losses without adequate
procedural safeguards, or for nonpublic ends, or when the State pur-
sues public ends but could just as easily and effectively do so in a way
that would not impose a loss on the complaining property owner.
In the first law review article to analyze systematically the possibil-
ity that judicial actions might engender governmental liability under
the Takings Clause, Barton Thompson posited that if the judiciary was
acting in a coordinated fashion with the legislature or the executive
86 It makes sense to speak of a law that-if it were valid under the Due Process
Clause-would nonetheless constitute a taking.
87 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (calling the due process inquiry "logically prior to and
distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking"); Robert G. Dreher, Lin-
gle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from Takings Doctrine, 30 HARV. ENvrL. L. REv.
371, 387-406 (2006).
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branch to wipe out a private property owner's rights, it made little
sense to let the government skirt its obligation to compensate the pri-
vate property owner.88 In his words, "By exempting courts from the
takings protections, we create an imbalance that invites the state to
attempt to accomplish through the judiciary what it cannot accom-
plish through the other branches of government-thereby unnecessa-
rily skewing the appropriate division of responsibility between the
branches."8 9 This objection has some force, and its sentiment was
echoed by the Stop the Beach plurality,90 but it is a further factor but-
tressing the importance of intentionality in determining what might
constitute a judicial taking. In this instance, coordination acts as a
proxy for intent. Coordinated action by two branches of government
requires that both branches know what they are doing and intend to
actjointly.9 1 Thus, all things being equal, in cases in which there is no
evidence of coordination, the risk that the judiciary is intentionally
taking private property for a public use is reduced.
What about coordination that occurs, not between two branches
of government, but between the judiciary and a powerful nongovern-
mental actor? Under our approach, cases involving a corrupt judge
who imposes a loss on a property owner to benefit a private party
would not be judicial takings. Such cases would instead violate the
Due Process Clause. Corruption of this sort can arise when the govern-
ment officials are themselves the direct beneficiaries. It can also man-
ifest itself when government officials are indirect beneficiaries, having
used the eminent-domain power to enrich their allies, perhaps with
the hope that their allies (or others) will return the favor in the fu-
ture. Extreme acts of self-dealing could subject government officials
to ex post criminal prosecution, regardless of whether the actors are
members of the judiciary, a legislature, or the executive branch. 92
Similarly, judges and executives can be impeached for self-dealing
that rises to the level of criminality, and legislators can be censured or
conceivably expelled. 93 But while these remedies may deter wrongdo-
88 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REv. 1449 (1990).
89 Id. at 1544.
90 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2601 (2010) (plurality opinion).
91 To be sure, coordination sometimes occurs despite an absence of joint intention.
This is how focal points can be created, seemingly by accident. But Thompson's concern
about coordination in the judicial takings context seems to stem from a fear of conspirato-
rial coordination designed to circumvent a constitutional protection. See Thompson, supra
note 88, at 1507-09, 1544. In such cases, it is plain that some level of intent on the part of
both branches of government will be necessary.
92 For an analysis of the Constitution's provisions designed to restrain corruption, see
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Coruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 342 (2009).
93 Recent cases include the impeachment of Federal District Judge G. Thomas
Porteous and the censure of Representative Charles Rangel. Both were accused of leverag-
ing the powers of their offices to enrich themselves by accepting benefits to which they
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ing, they provide little comfort to the landowner who has suffered an
unjust loss. That is the gap the Due Process Clause is designed to fill.
To be sure, there are divergences between the law's treatment of
self-dealing by judges and other sorts of governmental officials whose
conduct has long been thought to implicate the Takings Clause. Con-
straints on self-dealing by the judiciary arise via a number of doctrinal
avenues including the Due Process Clause and doctrines governing
judicial recusal. In some respects the constraints on judges are more
substantial than those placed on other government actors. For exam-
ple, while legislatures have self-imposed indirect limits on their free-
dom to engage in self-dealing through single-subject voting rules,
antilogrolling rules, disclosure obligations, gift limitations, and the
like, 94 there is no legislative doctrine that flatly prohibits legislators
from voting on legislation being promoted by their campaign contrib-
utors. By contrast, judges deciding cases in which the role of their
campaign contributors loom large may be substantially constrained by
due process considerations. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the
U.S. Supreme Court held that an objective standard determines
whether a judge's failure to recuse himself violates the Due Process
Clause.95 Courts are to take into account a "realistic appraisal of psy-
chological tendencies and human weakness" in assessing the risk that
a judge is actually biased or has prejudged the case. 96 Applying that
standard to the facts of Caperton, the Court held that the enormous
size of a single campaign contributor's spending, its temporal proxim-
ity to the West Virginia Supreme Court's consideration of the case
implicating that contributor's economic interests, and the contribu-
tor's very large stake in the outcome of that pending case warranted
recusal as a matter of law.97 In other respects though, constraints on
judges may be weaker than those imposed on other state actors. 98 For
example, judges may have broader immunity against suit for miscon-
duct than their counterparts in the executive branch and perhaps
even the legislature. 99
When compared with legislators, judges have relatively little in-
centive to deprive a private property owner of property because it is
were not entitled. See Michael A. Memoli, Senate Convicts Federal Judge, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2010, at A12; Richard Simon, Rangel Draws Ethics Censure, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at AA.
94 For a detailed discussion of these limitations, see Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation
and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 635-64 (1994).
95 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2254 (2009).
96 Id. at 2263 (citation omitted).
97 Id. at 2263-65.
98 Teachout notes that the Constitution contains more provisions designed to con-
strain the corruption of the executive and legislative branches than the judiciary. Teach-
out, supra note 92, at 368.
99 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 975, 1031-35
(2009).
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more difficult for those judges to capture the benefits associated with
the deprivations. This is particularly true forjudges with life tenure or
those who face little electoral pressure. Again, to the extent that a
judge does benefit financially from a ruling, particularly a ruling that
deprives a property owner of land or chattels, serious questions will
arise as to why the judge did not recuse at the outset of the litigation.
If it is indeed the case that judges are less likely to engage in self-
dealing, then there is less work for the Takings Clause to do. This
analysis suggests that self-dealing cases generally present poor candi-
dates for takings claims and particularly poor judicial takings claims.
In the absence of a Due Process Clause, we might wish the Tak-
ings Clause to incorporate an electoral test into the Constitution. Be-
cause the risk of self-dealing is greater in the case of elected judges
than in the case of appointed judges, the existence of an elected judi-
ciary in a particular jurisdiction ought to make us more inclined to
recognize the existence of a judicial taking there. But precisely be-
cause the Constitution has a Due Process Clause, and because that
clause polices the conduct of elected judges, 100 incorporating the
means ofjudicial selection into the takings calculus is unnecessary. By
the same token, the elected status of some judges might justify more
exacting scrutiny of due process claims against elected judges charged
with self-dealing.
E. Intentionality and Retroactivity
When judges (or legislatures or executives) change a rule of
property law, they have the option to apply the new rule retroac-
tively-that is, to property interests formed prior to the rule's
change-or prospectively only. The foregoing analysis suggests that it
is the Due Process Clause that is usually the proper vehicle for evaluat-
ing pure questions of retroactivity in judicial changes to property law.
For example, if a state court changes the law of easements, say, to
permit the reservation of an easement in a third party in order to
eliminate what it sees as a senseless formalism that interferes with par-
ties' expectations and reduces the efficiency of property law,10 1 the
court is almost certainly indifferent to the fact that one owner loses
the right to exclude and another gains the right to use a right of way.
Though the retroactive application of the rule may in some way en-
hance its effectiveness, the State is indifferent as to who wins or who
loses under the new rule. In these situations, the unfortunate owner's
lost property is not itself a means to achieving any public end. The
100 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for
S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) ("[D]ue process requires a 'neutral and detached judge in
the first instance .... '" (quoting Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972))).
101 See, e.g., Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972).
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sole question is the propriety of the retroactive application on the
owner in a way that imposes a loss. Due process is the better rubric to
apply when application of such a rule retroactively leads an owner to
lose property that she otherwise would have retained but where the
owner's loss-apart from that retroactivity-does not contribute to
the public good being pursued by the new rule. Where the retroactive
application of the rule to owners with existing property rights will in
no way assist in achieving the goals motivating the change in the rule,
applying the rule retroactively is likely to be arbitrary. This suggests a
due process inflected presumption against retroactivity when property
rules are changed. And this is, in fact, the prevailing norm in many
areas of property law. 102 Courts have often been unclear, however,
about whether the antiretroactivity principle arises under a takings or
due process analysis.' 03 It is important to recognize that, when all
signs indicate that the State is indifferent as to the identity of winners
and losers under the new rule, it cannot be said to have "taken" the
loser's private property "for public use" when it applies a new norm
retroactively, and a due process analysis of the propriety of the retro-
activity decision is the correct one.
In some cases, however, the retroactive application of the rule in
a way that imposes a loss on a specific property owner will be an essen-
tial component of the judge's plan for achieving the purposes animat-
ing the rule's change. For example, when the New Jersey Supreme
Court extended the reach of the public trust doctrine in Matthews v.
Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,10 4 its goal was to expand public recrea-
tional access to beaches in NewJersey where municipal access was not
available. The effective provision of public access means that the
court had to weaken certain waterfront owners' rights to exclude.
Opening up those particular owners' parcels was the strategy the court
used to achieve the goal of adequate public beach access. Its action
102 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Retroactivity, the Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 51 ALA.
L. REv. 1095, 1106-09 (2000). None of this suggests that courts do not apply new property
rules retroactively. But when they do so act retroactively, they usually feel the need to
explain why retroactive application is appropriate.
103 See Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 260-62 (N.Y. 1977) (call-
ing the retroactive application of a new rule that deprives an owner of the value of his
investment a violation of due process norms); Franza v. Olin, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807-08
(App. Div. 2010) (holding that the application of an amended adverse possession law to a
fully vested claim would constitute a taking of property without just compensation); Barra
v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 907 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73-74 (App. Div. 2010) (holding the same without
specifying the legal foundation for the nonretroactivity rule); see also Schrader v. Schrader,
101 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (same); Gorte v. Dep't of Transp., 507 N.W.2d
797, 800-01 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (same) (citing In re Certified Questions from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co.), 331 N.W.2d
456, 464 (Mich. 1982) (analyzing the impact of retroactivity on vested rights using a due
process rubric)).
104 471 A.2d 355 (NJ. 1984).
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was analogous to a city creating new zoning law that prohibits an ex-
isting use that is not itself a nuisance. The effectiveness of the zoning
regime depends on the eventual application of the new regulatory
scheme to land occupied by the prior nonconforming use. Impor-
tantly, in both of these circumstances, the losses these owners suffer is
not a matter of indifference but is intentionally instrumental to ac-
complishing the public purpose served by the new rules. In these cir-
cumstances, then, a takings analysis is the appropriate one, whether
the new rule is created by a zoning board, a legislature, or a court. As
we will discuss, this is not the same as saying that all new rules that
operate in this way are in fact takings that require just compensation.
It only means that, where a court makes a new rule and applies it to a
property owner because imposing a loss on that particular owner (or that
owner's parcel) will foster the rule's public purposes, it is appropriate to
apply ajudicial takings framework in analyzing the owners' claim that
their rights have been violated.
Existing state land-use doctrines concerning "vested rights" and
"prior nonconforming uses" have long protected existing land uses
from retroactive application of regulatory changes of this sort. 05 At a
minimum, courts have held, existing uses are entitled to a "reasona-
ble" transition, or "amortization," period following the introduction
of a new rule. This transition period ostensibly allows owners to
recoup a reasonable return on their investment before the new regu-
lation is applied to their nonconforming property.10 6 State courts fre-
quently justify these doctrines in constitutional terms, though often,
as Christopher Serkin notes, courts often employ them without speci-
fying any particular constitutional provision.10 7 Our analysis makes
clear that a takings analysis is usually the proper rubric for under-
standing the legal and normative underpinnings of these doctrines.
F. Regulatory Takings
The conception of the scope of the Takings Clause we advocate
here is fully consistent with the existence of a regulatory takings doc-
105 See, e.g., Quality Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Spencer, 586 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa
1998) (holding that, when a property owner makes substantial expenditures toward com-
pletion of a project, the owner acquires "the right to complete the development of his
property in accordance with his plans as of the effective date of the new ordinance"); Town
of Hillsborough v. Smith, 170 S.E.2d 904, 909 (N.C. 1969) (same); City of Dublin v. Finkes,
615 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that federal and state constitutions both
"recognize a right to continue a given use of real property if such use is already in exis-
tence at the time of the enactment of a land use regulation forbidding or restricting the
land use in question").
106 See, e.g., Modjeska Sign Studios, 373 N.E.2d at 260-62 (assessing the reasonableness of
an amortization provision prohibiting billboards on private land within a state park).
107 See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U.
L. Rav. 1222, 1223-32 (2009).
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trine. But the requirement of an intent to appropriate does help limit
the reach of that doctrine by restricting it to regulatory actions that
match certain characteristics of an actual exercise of eminent domain
in certain crucial respects.' 08 As the Court emphasized in Lingle, the
touchstone of the regulatory takings inquiry is an effort "to identify
regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking
in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts
the owner from his domain."109 It goes without saying that such regu-
latory appropriations must also be undertaken with the intent to
achieve a "public use" because, as with an exercise of eminent do-
main, regulatory takings analysis "presupposes that the government
has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose."110 The presence of
such a public purpose is virtually never at issue in a litigated regula-
tory takings case-though it is easy enough to imagine cases where the
issue might be contested. Less obvious, though equally necessary if
regulatory takings are to constitute the "functional equivalent" of an
explicit exercise of eminent domain, is the requirement that the regu-
latory body act with the purpose of employing the owner's private
property as the means of accomplishing that public purpose.
On the narrower, purposive reading of the Takings Clause, in
cases where a private owner's loss is merely incidental to a rule
change, as in the easement law hypothetical described above,' 1, ajudi-
cial (regulatory) takings analysis is not appropriate because, although
the owner has been deprived of property, her property has not been
taken by the State for public use. Her loss is more akin to the loss
suffered by a property owner when the State commits a tort. Again, it
is important to emphasize that this conclusion does not mean that the
retroactive application of a change in a property rule under these cir-
cumstances is permitted by the Constitution. It simply means that, if it
does, the violation is of some other norm, most likely the Due Process
Clause's protection against arbitrary or irrational treatment by state
actors.
In contrast, in the context of disputes over ownership between
private parties and the State (the second hypothetical we discussed at
the beginning of this Part), the notion that a change in the rules pur-
posefully takes property for public (i.e., State) use seems easy to see.
In these cases, it is almost a matter of indifference whether the "taker"
is understood to be the court or the state-actor litigant. What the judi-
cial takings doctrine would add to these cases is a tool to prevent state
108 See Krotoszynski, supra note 66, at 719.
109 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
110 Id. at 543.
111 See supra text accompanying note 101.
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courts from sidestepping the protections of the Takings Clause by
spuriously recharacterizing its prior property doctrine.
In short, we believe that there are good textual, precedential, and
conceptual reasons why the State's intentions are a critical factor in
determining whether a government action that diminishes an individ-
ual's private property rights are better dealt with under the Takings
Clause or the Due Process Clause. So far, our analysis has steered
clear of functional arguments. In the next Part, we develop the func-
tional argument in much more detail, showing that when the State is
financially responsible for judicial decisions that diminish the value of
private property, the likely consequence is an incentive for one of the
litigants to underinvest in legal representation. A desire to avoid tie
problems associated with this form of underinvestment may provide
us with additional tools to identify those cases in which treating a
court's decision as a potential judicial taking, rather than a due pro-
cess violation, makes sense.
II
THE UNDERINVESTMENT PROBLEM
What good would be accomplished by requiring that property
owners whose rights are diminished or destroyed by ajudicial decision
be compensated? Barton Thompson's classic article answered that
question in the following way:
In many situations, judicial changes in property law raise the same
concerns as legislative and executive takings.... By applying the
takings protections to the judiciary, we encourage courts to be more
sensitive to the impact that their decisions have on property holders
and thereby protect the values embedded in the takings
protections.112
Problematically, Thompson assumes that compensation would make
judges more sensitive to the impact that their rulings have on property
owners, but he does not explain the mechanism by which this would
occur. 113 It may be that courts would regard a determination that a
judicial taking had occurred as an ordinary reversal. There may be
some reputational costs associated with such a reversal, and it is even
conceivable that finding a judicial taking would impose a greater
stigma on a court than an ordinary reversal would. But if Thompson
intended to suggest that, by imposing liability on the government,
judges would be less likely to rearrange entitlements, then that is a
harder story to defend.
112 Thompson, supra note 88, at 1544.
113 See id.
2012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Judicial takings liability would be paid for out of general govern-
mental revenues, not out of the court's budget or judicial salaries. As
Daryl Levinson has shown, the Takings Clause may do a poor job of
forcing government officials generally to internalize externalities,
14
and that argument carries even more force as far as the judiciary is
concerned. Perhaps, then, judicial takings liability will not accom-
plish as much as its advocates hope. But another question remains
unanswered: Why should the judiciary be able to do something that
the other branches cannot do? From the landowner's perspective,
what matters is the loss, not the mechanism by which the loss occurs.
This critique plainly resonated with the plurality in Stop the Beach, who
wrote:
[T]he Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property
without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of
the taking. To be sure, the manner of state action may matter: Con-
demnation by eminent domain, for example, is always a taking,
while a legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of property use
may or may not be, depending on its nature and extent. But the
particular state actor is irrelevant.] 15
In our view, the identity of the state actor is relevant. In fact, there is a
good answer to the question of why we ought to treat judges differ-
ently from legislators and regulators.11 6
114 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Con-
stitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 345, 415-17 (2000).
115 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2602 (2010) (plurality opinion).
116 John Echeverria has provided a mix of five formalist and federalist reasons why it
may make sense to differentiate between judicial takings and takings by other branches of
the government. None of Echeverria's reasons go far afield from the briefs, opinions, and
oral argument in Stop the Beach. SeeJohn D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment:
Why the Judiciary Is Different, 35 VT. L. REv. 475, 485-93 (2010). More provocatively, Rich-
ard Epstein offered a very different sort of answer to the question of compensating parties
for ajudicial error in a footnote contained in his influential 1985 book on takings:
Initially, it seems clear that the [Tiakings [C]lause applies to judicial or-
ders. When the state resolves a dispute between A and B, it wrongfully takes
property if it makes the incorrect judgment. Forcing A to pay B $100 for a
debt not owed takes $100 from A. Not making A pay the $100 when it is
owed takes it from B. The demand for unbiased judges therefore translates
into a demand that the probability of error be symmetrically distributed, so
that each side receives, in the form of erroneous judgments in its favor, ex
ante compensation for those erroneous judgments entered against it. So
understood, absolute judicial immunity for erroneous judgments still satis-
fies both the just compensation and the public use requirements, because
the legal rule divides the anticipated surplus from collective action.
EPSTEIN, supra note 73, at 196 n.2. Our focus on the underinvestment problem and our
divergent view of takings cases more generally causes our analysis to differ from Epstein's.
We also deviate from Epstein in viewing considerations of judicial bias as relevant to the
due process inquiry, and in rejecting Epstein's supposition that the probabilities of error
will be distributed symmetrically. See infra text accompanying notes 124-36.
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The existence of a judicial takings cause of action creates two sets
of potentially perverse incentives. First, the availability of a judicial
takings cause of action may induce entitlement holders to invest too
little in protecting their entitlement in earlier stages of legal proceed-
ings. This underinvestment problem may in turn introduce unneces-
sary instability into property doctrine. Second, judicial takings may
prompt collusive deals in which what would ordinarily be disputes be-
tween two private parties become opportunities for those private par-
ties to divvy up a surplus provided by the taxpayers. By fully
compensating landowners who are deprived of their property as a re-
sult of the legislative, executive, or judicial change, we create, in ef-
fect, a free insurance policy for private property owners. As various
commentators have observed in the context of regulatory takings,
such an insurance policy necessarily diminishes the incentives for
landowners to resist that change in the first instance and may gener-
ate a kind of moral hazard. 17
Let us contemplate the first perverse incentive at the outset. Re-
call the hypothetical that we introduced in Part I. Suppose you are a
landowner involved in a dispute with a longtime trespasser. The tres-
passer has been occupying your land in good faith for a period slightly
longer than the statute of limitations on trespass actions. The tres-
passer thought that the land was his, not yours, on the date his tres-
pass began. Because your jurisdiction has long adhered to a rule that
prohibits good faith trespassers from acquiring title via adverse posses-
sion, you had little to fear in the litigation if you knew the trespasser's
state of mind. If the courts continue to follow existing precedents,
you will retain your land.
Now suppose that the courts deviate from existing precedents, for
example, by following the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a
trespasser's state of mind is irrelevant for the purposes of adverse pos-
session law. As a result, you will lose your land, but under the plurality
approach in Stop the Beach you may have a judicial takings cause of
action against the State for changing its property rules in a way that
deprived you of what previously was yours. Let us assume, as Justice
Kennedy argued in Stop the Beach and as the Court's unanimous opin-
ion in Lingle implied," 8 that the remedy for a judicial taking in this
sort of case will be the payment of just compensation. That is, if the
courts determine that a judicial taking has occurred, then the prop-
117 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 569, 592-99 (1984); Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain
Economics: Should 7ust Compensation" Be Abolished, and Would "Takings Insurance" Work In-
stead?, 64 OHIO ST. LJ. 451, 525-27 (2003); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509, 527-32, 551-52, 602-06 (1986); Levinson, supra note
114, at 392.
118 See supra text accompanying note 29.
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erty doctrine embraced by the lower court will not revert back but will
remain in place, followed by a constitutionally compelled payment by
the State to the party that lost its property.11 9
Judicial takings liability will raise underinvestment concerns simi-
lar to those associated with compulsory insurance. 120 Where the pre-
vailing party does not itself have to bear the costs of compensating the
loser for losses he suffers as a result of the rule change, the introduc-
tion of judicial takings liability may create asymmetric incentives for
the parties involved in litigation. Even with a doctrine like judicial
takings, the trespasser still has an incentive to litigate aggressively to
convince the courts to change property law in a way that will transfer
title over your land to him, as long as he will not be liable to compen-
sate the loser. You, by contrast, have a diminished incentive to resist a
change in the law in the presence of a compensation requirement, at
least at the first stage of the litigation. Only if the courts rule in favor
of the trespasser will you have a strong incentive to lawyer up. At that
point, even if the well-represented trespasser has won in the initial
proceedings, your judicial takings claim has a very high likelihood of
succeeding. In short, liability introduces an asymmetry into litigation
strategy that permits only the party advocating for a change in prop-
erty doctrine to realize the benefits of early investments in high-qual-
ity counsel. The law might try to mitigate the underinvestment
concern by requiring that judicial takings suits be highly deferential to
lower-court determinations of property rights, but even this would at-
tack the problem only indirectly. In any event, and for whatever rea-
son, the plurality in Stop the Beach was skeptical of such a tack, stating
that the Court would "make our own determination, without defer-
119 It might be a fair criticism of our approach to say that in this Part we are critiquing
a position that none of the Justices actually embraced in Stop the Beach. Stop the Beach left
open the question of whether the appropriate remedy in a judicial takings suit is the pay-
ment of just compensation alongside the maintenance of the new property rule or an
invalidation of the new property rule on the grounds that stripping an owner of an entitle-
ment without paying compensation is unconstitutional. Compare Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at
2607 (plurality opinion) (stating that compensation is not the only remedy, as the court
could simply invalidate the property rule), with id. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that an injured party is entitled to just compen-
sation but not equitable relief). The plurality might have intentionally wanted to couple its
aggressive view about the scope of the Takings Clause with its less aggressive view about
how often damages would be the appropriate remedy. For reasons we will explain later, we
believe that the plurality's view as to damages is in tension with Supreme Court precedents
on remedial questions, especially the Court's unanimous 2005 opinion in Lingle. See Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). The Stop the Beach plurality cited Lingle only
with approval. 130 S. Ct. at 2614-15 (plurality opinion). Therefore, absent some ratio-
nale for discarding Lingle's approach, we assume the correctness of an answer to the reme-
dial question that has garnered nine votes in the past, rather than one that garnered four
votes more recently.
120 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 97:305338
JUDICIAL TAKINGS OR DUE PROCESS?
ence to state judges, whether the challenged decision deprives the
claimant of an established property right."121
The foregoing analysis provides a plausible reason why Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion in Stop the Beach was right to reject the idea
that the surprising nature of a judicial decision makes that decision
more likely to constitute a judicial taking.1 22 Apart from the difficulty
of operationalizing a foreseeability test and the problems associated
with hindsight bias (which might make it difficult for courts to discern
after the fact which decisions depriving an owner of property rights
were surprising), 23 putting the thumb on the judicial takings scale
where decisions are surprising would only exacerbate the underinvest-
ment problem. If a surprising decision is more likely to constitute a
judicial taking, then the property owner's lessened incentive to hire a
good trial lawyer because of her chance to take a second bite at the
apple in a subsequent judicial takings suit is compounded by the di-
minished incentive to obtain high-quality representation at trial based
on the low ex ante probability of losing. Both incentives push against
retaining high-quality counsel. 124 Underinvestment problems such as
these will be most worrisome where (1) the costs of litigating an ap-
peal are low in comparison to the costs of litigating to summary judg-
ment or a trial; (2) the cost differential between a high-quality lawyer
and a low-quality lawyer is significant; (3) lawyer quality is relatively
outcome determinative; (4) the difference between prevailing at trial
and prevailing on appeal, legal costs aside, is marginal; and (5) low
levels of deference to trial-court determinations make reversals on ap-
peal relatively likely. Judicial takings suits typically would satisfy condi-
tions 1, 4, and 5. The impact of factors 2 and 3 on the typical judicial
takings suit is less clear.
This brings us to the second set of perverse incentives. Under a
judicial takings approach, it is not fanciful to believe that the asym-
metric litigation incentives between those seeking to change an ex-
isting entitlement and those seeking to preserve the status quo would
reward collusive behavior. Suppose that the trespasser approaches
you with the following offer:
121 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2608 n.9 (plurality opinion).
122 Id. at 2610.
123 On hindsight bias, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging
in Hindsight, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 571, 571-76 (1998).
124 There might be circumstances in which the fact that a decision was unsurprising
should make us inclined to think that a judicial taking occurred. If "surprising" decisions
are particularly likely to result from a process in which bad lawyering contributed to the
result, then a doctrine equating surprises with judicial takings would discourage clients
from seeking out good lawyers, with the result being more surprises. On this analysis, it is
possible thatJustice Stewart had it backwards when he argued that surprising judicial deci-
sions are good candidates for judicial takings treatment. See Hughes v. Washington, 389
U.S. 290, 296-98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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I will pay you $50,000 if you minimally defend yourself in a quiet
title action brought by me, the trespasser. Your land is worth
$100,000. If I prevail in my quiet title action, and the State changes
its adverse possession law to become more favorable to bad faith
adverse possessors, then you will sue the State for a judicial taking.
You will win your lawsuit and recover $100,000. I am $50,000 richer
because I own a $100,000 parcel of property and paid you $50,000.
You are $50,000 richer because you have my $50,000, and the State
compensated you fully for your lost land. The State is $100,000
poorer, but that's not your problem or mine.
Assuming away litigation expenses or a subjective attachment to
the property, would you take this deal? Wouldn't lots of people take
this deal? Deals of this sort are not obviously illegal under current law
if structured as part of a civil settlement,1 25 and it is not clear how the
State would effectively identify this sort of collusion as it was happen-
ing and intervene so as to protect its fiscal interests. At least in those
instances where the just compensation required by the Constitution is
close to the landowner's subjective value, we might expect to see collu-
sive deals of precisely this sort. 12 6 Collusion of this sort is also easier to
125 If the collusive settlement was discovered, then the State might try to avoid paying
just compensation by virtue of the landowner having received compensation from the tres-
passer. This argument might prevail, but it will be difficult for states to detect settlements
of this sort, particularly if arranged by unscrupulous counsel who have structured a settle-
ment so as to avoid detection. For example, there may be multiple claims at issue in the
suit, and any money that changes hands pursuant to a settlement may be characterized as a
payment for harm stemming from the other claims.
126 One factor to consider in going forward is the extent to which imposing liability for
judicial takings identifies the most appropriate defendant. In a case where an administra-
tive agency or an executive causes a regulatory taking, it may make some sense to have the
beneficiary of the regulation compensate the party burdened by the regulation. This dy-
namic sets up a "givings" problem of the sort discussed in Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 549-57 (2001). In the absence of a givings
clause in the Constitution, taxing the benefited party may be impracticable. Indeed, a
regulatory taking is supposed to be an instance of the State regulating in a manner so as to
confer benefits on the public more broadly. A regulatory taking is not supposed to rob
Peter to pay Paul, so making Paul pay Peter off is a problematic remedy. But what about
judicial takings of the sort represented by our adverse possession hypothetical? The case
caption in such controversies is Peter versus Paul. A lower court ruling in which Peter's
preexisting property rights were abrogated and in which Paul's property rights were aug-
mented does seem to present a straightforward remedial opportunity: make Paul pay Peter
the value of the property rights that Peter lost. This raises the question of whether the
courts or a private party is the appropriate defendant in a takings suit more generally. In
our view, unless redistribution as between Peter and Paul is the goal of the new rule, impos-
ing liability on the State in cases involving a redistribution of property rights from Peter to
Paul makes less sense than drawing on Paul's resources to make Peter whole. The compari-
son to good-faith improver statutes in California, NewJersey, and otherjurisdictions, which
transfer title to a good-faith improver from a prior'owner, upon the payment of just com-
pensation by the former to the latter, is instructive. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. ConE § 871.5
(West 2010) (giving the court broad discretion to select appropriate equitable or legal
relief). Similarly instructive was the mechanism that Hawaii adopted in the land-reform
statute at issue in Midkiff See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1983).
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arrange in the courts than in the legislature, because there are only
two parties who need to coordinate and keep a secret, not dozens or
hundreds.
Although most eminent domain awards of just compensation are
undercompensatory, it would be relatively easy for parties seeking a
collusive settlement to identify a subset of properties in which subjec-
tive value to the owner and fair market value are closely matched, and
to approach only those owners. 127 More generally, this analysis helps
us realize that it is the undercompensatory nature of many just com-
pensation awards that helps keep the underinvestment problem in
check. Some property scholarship has suggested compensating own-
ers above fair market value for takings, 128 and our analysis shows a
concern raised by such an approach. 29
The idea that takings liability represents a form of compulsory
insurance is a point that has been made elsewhere in the regulatory
takings literature. But the issue has not been incorporated into dis-
cussions of judicial takings, where it has the most force due to the
distinctive nature ofjudicial decision making. Particularly in those in-
stances in which the judicial takings claimant was the party who liti-
gated and lost below, the availability of ajudicial takings remedy limits
the resources that a rational litigant will devote to the first stage of the
legal proceedings. This idea is merely the analog to a more familiar
argument that in the presence of a Takings Clause claim, affected par-
ties might devote fewer resources to lobbying against a policy change
that will adversely affect their property interests.130 In this case, be-
cause of the asymmetric incentives created by judicial takings doc-
trine, lower-priced, lower-quality law firms will be able to outcompete
That law empowered the State to condemn privately owned land and convey that land to
the owners of homes built on the land in order to address the extreme concentration of
land ownership that prevailed in the state. But it required homeowners to reimburse the
State for the value of the land they were to receive under the scheme. See id. at 234.
127 Cf Garnett, supra note 73, at 142-43 (noting that property owners are sometimes
very happy to sell property to the government quickly, particularly when there is a good
prospect for receiving compensation above fair market value).
128 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 73, at 184; Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736-37
(1973); Fennell, supra note 73, at 993-95.
129 See also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings Com-
pensation, 96 VA. L. REv. 1673, 1676, 1706-09 (2010) (arguing that compensating owners at
greater than fair market value would encourage corruption in the takings process).
130 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285,
306-21 (1990) [hereinafter Levmore, Just Compensation]; Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and
Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1344-48 (1991); see also Been, supra note 34, at 306
(noting that although David Lucas knew that the South Carolina legislature would grandfa-
ther in beachfront development projects that had begun prior to the initiation of a devel-
opment ban, he "made no effort to obtain a building permit," even as he followed the
legislation's advance toward becoming law).
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higher-priced, higher-quality law firms in the battle for early-stage le-
gal work.
There is a salient difference between the judicial takings context
and the general regulatory taking context from the perspective of the
underinvestment problem. The legislature and agency, after all, have
considerable resources at their disposal to conduct their own fact find-
ing and analysis. The Office of Management and Budget, the General
Accounting Office, the Congressional Research Service, the Congres-
sional Budget Office, and their state equivalents provide executives
and legislators with a great deal of pertinent information relevant to
the task of lawmaking. Then there is the role of lobbyists, for better
or worse. We typically conceptualize expenditures on lobbying legisla-
tors or administrative agencies engaged in rulemaking as something
akin to a deadweight loss. While lobbyists might expose majoritarian
bodies to information and ideas possessed by discrete minorities with
a lot at stake in the legislative outcome, a well-functioning two-party or
multiparty democracy will provide many mechanisms by which this in-
formation will come to light, even if the minorities at issue do not
employ lobbyists. If any individual interested party remains silent in
the lobbying process, that silence is unlikely to significantly under-
mine the quality of the legislative or administrative decision. After all,
lobbying is typically multilateral. On any issue there may be a score of
affected firms and individuals lobbyists at the table. Little ordinarily
rides on the absence of any single lobbyist from a smoke-filled
room.
1 3 1
Judicial decision making is structured differently. It is built on an
adversarial process in which the courts necessarily delegate a great
deal of the legal research to the litigants themselves. Moreover, the
litigants have the exclusive responsibility to generate the facts that will
be relevant in the proceedings. Through doctrines like waiver, com-
mon-law courts may even prevent themselves from considering facts
known to be true but that were nevertheless not brought forward be-
cause of errors made or calculated risks taken by the parties' counsel.
With only two parties to make arguments in a typical case, the failures
of a single litigant to make the most effective arguments possible may
well compromise the soundness of a court's final decision. 13 2 Ajudge
may have a few law clerks to assist in supplementing the research pro-
131 Administrative adjudication resembles litigation much more closely than it resem-
bles administrative rulemaking, so there are good arguments for uniform treatment of
"adjudicative takings" regardless of whether an agency or a court is the entity that deprives
an owner of her entidement.
132 In nonadversarial civil law systems, by contrast, the arguments for expansive judicial
takings protections are much stronger because the courts do not externalize as many legal
research and fact-finding costs to the parties' counsel. See Gregory F. Hauser, Representing
Clients from Civil Law Legal Systems in U.S. Litigation: Understanding How Clients from Civil Law
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vided by the parties, but even the best clerks will lack the experience
and expertise to notice all of private counsel's mistakes and omissions.
In a world where each judge had twenty seasoned and well-paid clerks,
we would not need to worry so much about using doctrine to incen-
tivize private counsel to develop their best arguments. Alas, neither of
us expects American judges to wake up in that world any time soon.
There are instances elsewhere in law where similar sorts of under-
investment might exist. For example, in the criminal context, a defen-
dant can retain private counsel of low quality and subsequently
challenge a resulting conviction on the basis of an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel argument. Courts apply the same standard for inef-
fective assistance of counsel regardless of whether the defendant's
lawyer was privately obtained or court appointed. 133 In theory, the
availability of an ineffective assistance claim could prompt defendants
to underinvest in quality representation at trial. That said, the very
difficult legal standard for prevailing on such a claim 13 4 combined
with the fact that the defendant convicted at trial will often be incar-
cerated during the appellate process substantially alleviates these con-
cerns. 135 A judicial takings claimant typically has relatively little skin
in the game as the case proceeds beyond a final judgment at trial, and
the plurality in Stop the Beach rejected the suggestion that a deferential
standard of review would apply.13 6
In short, legislative and administrative rulemaking processes are
thought not to suffer unduly when affected parties lack strong incen-
tives to bring the relevant precedents and facts to the attention of the
decision maker. The judicial process, by contrast, can break down
Nations View Civil Litigation and Helping Them Understand U.S. Lawsuits, 17 INT'L L. PRAcri-
cUM 129, 131 (2004).
13 See generally United States v. Williams, 562 F.3d. 938, 940-41 (8th Cir. 2009) (apply-
ing an "objective standard of reasonable competence" for a claim for ineffective
assistance).
134 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ("Judicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential."); Allen v. Secretary, 611 F.3d 740, 751
(11th Cir. 2010) (noting that to prevail in federal court habeas proceedings, a challenge to
a State's finding that counsel was not ineffective, a petitioner must show that the state
court's conclusion was objectively unreasonable as a matter of law).
135 Doug Keller, Resolving a "Substantial Question ": Just Who Is Entitled to Bail Pending
Appeal Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 825, 826 (2008).
136 See supra text accompanying note 121. To be sure, other doctrines may create un-
derinvestment problems that the law tolerates. For example, the American rule, which
typically requires the prevailing party to pay his own legal fees, may well encourage parties
to underinvest in high-quality legal representation. The British rule of loser pays, by con-
trast, does not dampen incentives to invest in high-quality legal representation, though it
may have other effects, such as promoting settlement. For an assessment and review of the
literature, see John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't
Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991).
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under such circumstances, at least in common-law systems. 137 Courts
therefore have developed rules and norms that penalize lawyers for
failing to bring controlling precedents to the attention of the judges.
But in a judicial takings suit, the omissions of a lawyer for the plaintiff
or nongovernmental defendant are not obviously relevant to the in-
quiry, since it is the State's conduct that is being challenged. Indeed,
in Stop the Beach itself, it was revealing that the Florida Supreme Court
had failed to cite Martin v. Busch,138 its own 1927 precedent that
squarely addressed the situation before the Florida courts in Stop the
Beach.139 The lower courts omitted any discussion of Martin as well. 140
The U.S. Supreme Court plurality did note that the Florida Su-
preme Court had failed to cite Martin.14 1 The Florida court's omis-
sion was hardly the fault of Florida's lawyers, who argued in the
Florida Supreme Court that Martin resolved many of the issues then
before the court.142 Petitioners' lawyers, by contrast, basically ignored
Martin, even though Florida insisted that it was relevant. 143 After the
Florida Supreme Court similarly ignored Martin altogether, Florida's
lawyers may have felt chastened. They too ignored Martin in their
U.S. Supreme Court opposition to certiorari, 144 an omission that in
hindsight likely contributed to the Court's decision to grant certio-
rari. 145 After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Florida brought
Martin to the Justices' attention in its merits briefing, though the State
softened its claim as to Martin's relevance, describing it as "somewhat
137 Cf Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 439, 449-54 (2009) (discussing the costs associated with pro se litigation in the
United States); Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of
Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 Am. U. L. REv. 1537, 1547-49 (2005)
(discussing the administrative burdens resulting from pro se litigation).
138 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927).
139 See supra text accompanying notes 6-18.
140 See, e.g., Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.
2008); Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So.3d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
141 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2612 (2010) (plurality opinion).
142 See Initial Brief of the Department of Environmental Protection & Board of Trust-
ees of the Internal Improvement Fund at 25-29, Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d 1102 (No. SC06-
1449), 2006 WL 3074094.
143 See Petitioners/Appellants' Initial Brief on the Merits, Walton Cnty., 998 So.2d 1102
(No. SC06-1447), 2006 WL 3074093; Petitioners/Appellants' Reply Brief on the Merits,
Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d 1102 (No. SC06-1447), 2006 WIL 3932222.
144 See Respondent Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Brief in Opposi-
tion, Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2009) (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 1206633.
145 Giving the keynote address at a Chicago-Kent College of Law conference, "Judicial
Takings: Property Rights and the Rule of Law" on October 18, 2011, Justice Scalia said of
Stop the Beach, "We didn't take the case to decide Florida law, for Pete's sake." See Scalia
Criticizes Kelo Ruling on Private Property, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.
chicagolawbulletin.com/Elements/pages/print.aspx?printpath=/Articies/201 1/10/19/1 7
494&classname=tera.GN3Article.
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similar to the instant case." 146 The brief filed by Solicitor General Ka-
gan on behalf of the federal government discussed Martin as well, us-
ing slightly stronger language. 14 7 But well-represented parties were
not uniform in grasping the significance of the prior precedents.
Even the brief for sophisticated amici like the Pacific Legal Founda-
tion and Cato Institute ignored Martin.148 Had they understood the
case correctly, these capable amici probably would have sought out a
better vehicle for the Supreme Court's initial foray into judicial tak-
ings doctrine.
It is easy to ask "What if?" and imagine a scenario in which Flor-
ida's lawyers, like the lawyers for the plaintiffs, amici, and the judges
on the Florida Supreme Court, failed to grasp the significance of Mar-
tin v. Busch. Like many property precedents from the 1920s, Martin is
not written in a straightforward way. While we believe the Supreme
Court Justices correctly concluded that Martin seems to have settled
the issue being litigated in Stop the Beach, we can see how even diligent
counsel might have failed to understand the relationship between the
two cases. Indeed, recent events in the Supreme Court have shown
that even the U.S. Solicitor General's Office can overlook critical au-
thority on occasion, failing to bring it to the Court's attention. 149
Even the most capable, best-incentivized lawyers are imperfect legal
researchers. Mistakes will be relatively common for less capable,
poorly motivated counsel.
The failure of the lower courts and some counsel to recognize the
importance of Martin illustrates the potential costs of failing to
ground ajudicial takings doctrine, resulting in an unrealistic model of
property law and the litigation process. The Stop the Beach plurality
envisions a world in which property rights are straightforward and
readily discerned by courts and litigants alike.' 50 Recall the plurality's
146 See Brief of Respondents, Florida Department of Environmental Protection &
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund at 18, Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct.
2592 (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 3143707.
147 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra
note 16, at 26.
148 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Cato Institute, NFIB Legal Center, & Pacific Legal Foun-
dation in Support of Petitioner, Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL
2588282.
149 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2008) (explaining the Court's denial
of a rehearing despite the Justices having ruled in an Eighth Amendment case in a manner
suggesting their embarrassing ignorance of 10 U.S.C. § 856 (2006), a federal child-rape
statute that was not mentioned in any of the briefs to the Court); Terry Eastland, Supremely
Screwed Up: A Do-Over for the High Court?, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 4, 2008, http://
www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/365drohy.asp (discuss-
ing the Kennedy v. Louisiana mistake made by the Solicitor General's Office, which admit-
ted its error in failing to file a brief when the Court considered that case).
150 Justice Scalia has long held this view of property law as a readily discerned set of
rules. See his opinion for the majority in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1015-16 (1992).
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central formulation of its test for judicial takings'it is a dead give-
away as to the formalism inherent in its approach: "If a legislature or a
court declares that what was once an established right of private prop-
erty no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the
State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its valu by regula-
tion.' 151 To the plurality, the universe of property claims is binary:
some are "established," in which case a deprivation of them is ajudi-
cial taking. Other property rights are doubtful, in which case there
can be no judicial taking. 152 To property scholars, however, such a
dichotomy seems inapt. Property rights are sometimes quite clear, but
in Stop the Beach and other sorts of cases likely to be litigated in appel-
late courts, the precise boundaries of even "established" entitlements
may be murky and contested. 153 Parties can invest in discovering the
scope of their entitlements to particular resources, and the more they
invest in such discovery, the more clarity they will achieve with respect
to the rights and obligations attendant to their property. Just as pri-
vately retained counsel are more likely to reach erroneous assessments
of property entitlements if they do not invest sufficient resources in
researching their scope, courts may err as well. Indeed, inadequate
research expenditures by opposing counsel make erroneous determi-
nations by the courts more likely. With each step up the appellate
ladder, erroneous assessments of the scope of "established" property
rights become less likely. But at no point are they reduced to zero.
These three inevitabilities-the uncertain nature of the property
rights likely to be contested in the courts of appeals; the resource,
research, and analytical constraints faced by counsel; and the fallibility
of all courts-provide another way to think about judicial takings and
the circumstances under which a party ought to be compensated.
In a judicial takings suit, what should follow from these sorts of
omissions and who should be financially responsible for such blun-
ders? One can imagine courts developing ad hoc waiver or preclusion
doctrines within judicial takings jurisprudence to deal with the prob-
lem of mounting government liability resulting from poor lawyering
by plaintiffs. The courts could hold that a party alleging that the
courts worked a judicial taking would be collaterally estopped from
raising arguments in the judicial taking suit that had not been raised
below. Some language in the Stop the Beach plurality opinion suggests
receptiveness to the development of these sorts of procedural rules.154
On the other hand, both the way the plurality structured the test for
151 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
152 See id. at 2608 n.9.
153 See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 580-90
(1988).
154 The plurality in Stop the Beach suggested that waiver would apply to issues not raised
in the petition for certiorari. 130 S. Ct. at 2610 & n.11 (plurality opinion).
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judicial takings and the practice rules dictating that lawyers for both
sides in a case are obliged to bring controlling authority to the atten-
tion of the court suggest that-depending on the breadth of the judi-
cial takings doctrine-the government might have to pay for the
mistakes of a lawyer representing a private property owner. 155
Advocates of judicial takings liability have argued that the re-
quirement of compensation will promote stability in property law. 156
But we can now see how the underinvestment problem associated with
judicial takings liability in disputes between private landowners might
push the other way. The stability of property law is promoted by
courts that have a full understanding of what the law presently is and
what the costs of changing it would be. 157 When parties lack the
proper incentives to educate the courts there is a substantial risk that
judges will create the worst sort of instability-the kind created out of
ignorance. If state litigation must reach a final judgment on the mer-
its before a federal judicial takings suit can be brought to correct the
state court's error, then it may take a decade before an error is defini-
tively corrected. In the interim, erroneous precedent will stand, con-
fusing other courts and the many parties that will negotiate deals or
make investments in the shadow of the law. The underinvestment as-
sociated with judicial takings liability will reduce the quality ofjudicial
decision making and the coherence of property law. The direction of
the effect seems clear, though its magnitude is very difficult to esti-
mate. In a world with no judicial takings liability, by contrast, both the
private property owner and the adverse litigant have incentives to hire
the best lawyers to advance the best arguments, constrained of course
by the stakes at issue in the litigation. The likelihood that the court
will erroneously or unthinkingly abrogate existing property rights is
diminished.
In light of this dynamic, there is a strong connection between the
intentionality test we offered in Part I and the underinvestment test
we develop in this Part. Where parties that hold existing entitlements
have strong incentives to invest in high-quality legal representation at
the earlier stages in the proceedings, there is a lower probability that
the courts will unwittingly deprive the entitlement holder of her prop-
155 See id. at 2602 (holding that "[i]f a legislature or a court declares that what was once
an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property," regard-
less of the competence of either plaintiffs or defendant's counsel).
156 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 88, at 1544. But see Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at
2615-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
state-court judges may be more likely to change property rules abruptly if they know that
the parties that lose as a result of these changes will receive just compensation).
157 See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647, 652-53 (1999) (discussing the importance of stable
judicial doctrine to robust property rights).
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erty rights. 158 And, in the absence of judicial mistakes, the depriva-
tions that remain may end up being easier to evaluate for takings or
due process violations. In other words, by creating incentives for in-
vestment in litigation resources, a narrower judicial takings doctrine
may do a better job of protecting property entitlements over the long
run than an expansive compensation requirement such as the one
that the Stop the Beach plurality envisioned.
In cases involving private parties litigating over whether property
doctrines should change, the due process doctrine can address the
problems associated with underinvestment in high-quality legal repre-
sentation relatively easily. The extent to which a property owner has
made rational investments in high-quality legal representation or as-
sisted them fully in their development of arguments seems like a natu-
ral consideration in procedural-due-process analysis. 159 Incorporating
such a concern into a doctrine of judicial takings, however, presents
more of a challenge. Property law is designed to create stable entitle-
ments that promote investments in improvements, and the law favors
property protection when it does not force an owner to negotiate or
go to court to get third parties to respect his rights. 160 It would be
strange, therefore, to hold that a party that had failed to hire an effec-
tive lawyer in the initial legal proceedings would have a weakened tak-
ings claim as a result. After all, in other takings contexts, the fact of a
mistake by the State as to ownership of property would not bar a claim
for compensation under the Takings Clause, even if the property
owner could have alerted the State to its mistake in a timelier man-
ner.161 We propose a solution to this problem below, by arguing that
comparative fault principles might be used to reduce just-compensa-
tion awards when a litigant's insufficient investment in high-quality
lawyering contributed to that litigant's loss of an entitlement. 162 But
158 Cf 18 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4423 (2d
ed. 2002) (discussing the rationale behind requiring an incentive to litigate for issue pre-
clusion purposes).
159 Cf Matheney v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883, 891-93 (Ind. 1997) (holding that a client's
decisions to not cooperate fully with his lawyer's preferred legal strategies inform the de-
termination as to whether a postconviction hearing complied with the requirements of the
Due Process Clause). See generally Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 319-34 (1985) (discussing the circumstances under which the Due Process Clause
requires that claimants have meaningful access to high-quality legal representation).
160 See John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REv.
463, 466 (2007) ("American courts have also routinely subscribed to the view that property
law's fundamental goal is to provide stability and security in ownership and title.").
161 In Stop the Beach itself, there was a six-year lag between the land-use decision the
petitioners challenged (July 2004) and the Supreme Court's final resolution of the prop-
erty law issues (July 2010). Of course, in Stop the Beach, the litigation never reached the
federal district court stage, nor the federal court of appeals stage, which could have slowed
down matters considerably.
162 See infra text accompanying notes 199-203.
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we recognize that making such factors relevant would represent a sig-
nificant departure from existing just-compensation law. Thus, if due
process becomes the primary avenue by which claims regarding judi-
cially abrogated entitlements are litigated, the law could-without too
much trouble-differentiate between parties that diligently bring the
relevant legal rules to lower courts' attention and parties that had
waited until after a lower-court defeat to act assertively.
Even if the courts were to embrace a robust waiver doctrine, how-
ever, it would not solve the underinvestment problem. There is a dif-
ference between raising an argument in the lower courts with
sufficient specificity as to avoid waiver and advocating an argument in
the most forceful and persuasive way. Absent very strong deference to
lower courts on questions of law, it is essentially -impossible to con-
struct a legal doctrine that both makes available a judicial takings
claim for parties that lose their property rights in the first round of
litigation and avoids dampening the incentive of those parties to in-
vest in vindicating their rights in that round of litigation. Something
like a comparative-fault doctrine could mitigate the underinvestment
problem, but unless judges have perfect information about unobserv-
able facts, even that innovation would not incentivize socially optimal
behavior by litigants. This is why it is important to correctly define the
scope of the judicial takings doctrine at the outset.
Suppose we were to replay history, and this time Florida's lawyers
and the Solicitor General's office had failed to grasp Martin v. Busch's
significance. Suppose further that the Justices and their law clerks
had similarly missed the case. Under these circumstances, it is con-
ceivable that the Supreme Court would have held that the actions of
the Florida courts deprived the plaintiffs of their ownership rights to
accretions and their rights to have their littoral property come into
contact with the water, constituting a judicial taking. There were cer-
tainly Florida precedents lending some support to such an argu-
ment. 16 3 If the Supreme Court's conclusions about the substance of
Florida property law were treated as authoritative by state and federal
courts in Florida, the Court would have, in effect, unwittingly abro-
gated a property right that had belonged to the state government,
which should have owned the land by virtue of Martin. But wouldn't it
necessarily follow (under the broadest interpretations of judicial tak-
ings) that the Supreme Court itself had, in (incorrectly) adjudicating
one party's claim for a judicial taking, committed a judicial taking of
its own? Who is to police judicial takings by the highest judicial body?
Imagine that, after the mandate issues in Stop the Beach, the State's
lawyers turn up Martin v. Busch and understand its implications. Since
163 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1987).
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the federal government must compensate state governments when it
takes their property under the Takings Clause, 164 the State of Florida
might then be able to file a suit in federal court, alleging that the U.S.
Supreme Court had taken its property when it misadjudicated the ju-
dicial takings claim. Accretions that should have belonged to the
State had been transferred to private property owners as a result of
Stop the Beach. It seems the State in this follow-on case should win.
Although we have framed it as a hypothetical, the possibility ofjudicial
takings by the Supreme Court is real. Arguably, under Stop the Beach,
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Keystone Bituminous Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis was a judicial taking, insofar as it abrogated the right of a
property owner to recover for a claim that had been clearly recog-
nized by Supreme Courtjurisprudence for more than a generation. 165
After all, as five Justices noted a few years after Keystone Bituminous was
handed down, the law at issue in Keystone Bituminous was "nearly iden-
tical" to the statute at issue in Mahon.166
Is there an alternative to this possibility of a merry-go-round of
litigation of the same entitlements, particularly in the case of similarly
situated landowners who were not involved in the original litigation?
Due process provides a sensible framework for considering these is-
sues. The Takings Clause inquiry focuses on the magnitude of a pri-
vate loss and the social justifications for imposing that loss on a
particular owner, leaving little room for questions like whether a liti-
gant was involved in earlier litigation. 167 The Due Process framework
provides a more attractive way to analyze these sorts of issues.
A Mathews v. Eldridge procedural-due-process approach, with its
focus on providing owners with a reasonable opportunity to be heard,
would balance the property owner's investments in representation
against the value of the interests at stake. 168 Where little is at stake,
164 See Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of
Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 830-32 (1989).
165 See 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (rejecting on virtually identical facts the central holding in
the landmark regulatory takings case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922), which had held that Pennsylvania legislation designed to prevent subsidence of
surface land over coal deposits amounted to a regulatory taking by depriving the coal com-
pany of a support estate that it had purchased from the surface owners); Mulvaney, supra
note 29, at 259.
166 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
167 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (describing the regula-
tory takings inquiry as focusing "upon the severity of the burden that government imposes
upon private property rights" in contrast to a due process inquiry focused on the rational-
ity of the government's policy decision). The Court's discussion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001), of the timing of an owner's acquisition of property relative to
the imposition of a regulatory burden does not reflect an effort to inquire into the owner's
opportunity to influence the rulemaking process. Rather, that case concerned the thresh-
old question of whether an owner ever actually owned the interest he accused the govern-
ment of taking from him.
168 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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the owner could get away with lesser investments in legal representa-
tion. Where the stakes are high and the risk of loss significant, a due
process framework would penalize the property owner who failed to
take reasonable steps to obtain highly qualified legal representation in
a case affecting her property rights.' 69 Under such a procedural-due-
process approach, cases in which a party that had been involved in
round one of the litigation sues in round two may be treated differ-
ently than cases in which the party alleging the deprivation of a prop-
erty right was not a litigant in the proceedings below.170
Now the property owner challenging the court's action had lim-
ited opportunities to prevent the abrogation of his property rights in
the first instance. That is not to say that the challenger had no capac-
ity to affect the results in the proceedings below. After all, the prop-
erty owner could have filed an amicus brief or perhaps even moved to
intervene. But the question arises as to whether that is a reasonable
burden to place on property owners. Property law often embraces the
169 To be sure, judicial takings liability creates incentives that might cut the other way.
For example, unclear statutory regimes may lend themselves to greater fluctuations in the
content of private property rights. The less clear a statutory regime, the more judges will
struggle with identifying the holders of property rights and the scope of those rights. Judi-
cial takings liability therefore could function as a disciplining mechanism. Legislatures will
have incentives to create clear entitlements at the outset so as to minimize the risk of
judicial error and attendant judicial takings liability. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The
Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUEs 549, 564-65 (2005) (discussing the possibility that judicially enforced clear
statement rules might prompt more careful legislative deliberation). Assuming that we
would like to see legislatures, as opposed to courts, dictating the substance of property
rights, it would be beneficial to incentivize the creation of clearer legislative rules. Courts
in landmark cases like Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.
1990), and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), have articulated the idea that
legislatures ought to be the legal institution of choice when it comes to recognizing new
private property rights. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 496 ("If the scientific users of human cells
are to be held liable for failing to investigate the consensual pedigree of their raw materi-
als, we believe the Legislature should make that decision."); see also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at
317 ("The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the
legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative
bodies can provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing
values and interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected representa-
tives. Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to
the political branches of the Government.. . ."); id. at 308 ("We have also cautioned that
courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature
has not expressed." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Even taking this
preference for legislative action as a given, it is conceivable that legislatures could respond
to the prospect of judicial takings liability in a different way. That is, they might simply
become much more reluctant to create new entitlements in the first place. If they create
no entitlements, they can incur no takings liability. This concern might warrant skepticism
about imposing liability for any sort of regulatory taking, but it is most salient in those
domains where an institution other than the legislature will be responsible for avoiding
liability. Seen in this light, the legislature's inability to prevent judicial takings coupled
with its liability for those takings heightens the danger that legislatures will enact prophy-
lactically unduly cautious policies.
170 See Barros, supra note 33, at 951.
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idea that owners do not usually have to explain themselves. 171 Be-
cause property law is designed to promote secure investments, the law
hesitates to impose on owners an affirmative burden to remain con-
stantly vigilant about shifting legal doctrines that may affect their
rights. The almost-universal practice in property law (particularly in
the land-use context) is to exempt existing property entitlements from
new rules, grandfathering them in, either for some extended period
of time, until the property changes hands, or the property owner
ceases to avail herself of the old rule.172 The question of how much of
a burden to place on owners to keep abreast of litigation activity that
might affect their rights is one of trade-offs. On the one hand, incen-
tivizing similarly situated parties to participate in litigation reduces the
risk of judicial error. On the other hand, we recognize that forcing
the similarly situated parties to monitor litigation that might conceiva-
bly affect their rights substantially burdens large numbers of owners.
The preceding discussion assumes that a party that has lost the
entitlement as a result of a court's reversal of a longstanding property
doctrine is entitled to damages. As we discussed above, however, this
remedial question was the subject of an extensive back and forth be-
tween the Stop the Beach plurality, which thought invalidation of the
judicial decision giving rise to the taking would be the normal rem-
edy, and Justice Kennedy, who assumed that damages was the proper
remedy for a violation of the Takings Clause. 173 If we assumed that
the plurality's approach to remedies was the correct one, and that
landowners would be entitled to have regulations that constitute judi-
cial takings invalidated (with the payment of damages only for the
time during which the regulation was in effect), how would that
change the analysis of asymmetric litigation incentives offered above?
It is tempting to think that the availability of a judicial takings chal-
lenge in the federal courts would simply resemble an additional layer
of appellate review, with a (small) possibility that the federal courts
might effectively reverse a state court's interpretation of its own prop-
erty rules. 174 If that were the case then the availability of a judicial
takings remedy would not result in any asymmetry between the party
seeking to change the existing arrangement of entitlements and the
171 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104
MIcH. L. REv. 1835, 1847 n. 47 (2006).
172 See Serkin, supra note 107, at 1223 n.1, 1224-32 & n.4; see also supra notes 105-07
and accompanying text (discussing ways in which state land-use doctrines protect
entitlements).
173 See supra text accompanying note 30.
174 In that case, the process would resemble an approach recently advocated by
Jonathan Mitchell, who argues that federal courts should take a more active role in inter-
preting state law so as to minimize the need to reach a federal constitutional question
unnecessarily. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Reconsidering Murdock: State-Law Reversals as Constitu-
tional Avoidance, 77 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1335, 1336-39 (2010).
[Vol. 97:305
JUDICIAL TAKINGS OR DUE PROCESS?
party advocating a continuation of existing rules. But upon closer re-
flection, a judicial takings inquiry differs from an additional layer of
appellate review in one important respect: it is an additional layer that
is available only to a party that has lost its preexisting entitlement. As
a conceptual matter, this asymmetry should have two countervailing
effects: it will incentivize parties seeking to preserve the status quo to
invest fewer resources in defending their rights at each stage of the
legal proceedings, and it could make parties that would like to change
existing entitlements less likely to attempt to do so via the courts. The
former effect promotes instability in property doctrine, while the lat-
ter effect may cut the other way under certain assumptions about the
propensities of courts and legislatures. It is not clear which effect
would dominate, though it seems at least plausible that the net result
of judicial takings liability would be increased instability in entitle-
ments, even if injunctive relief becomes the default remedy.
In his recent Yale Law Journal article, Jonathan Masur argues that
the unidirectional availability of appellate review can skew substantive
litigation outcomes systematically. 175 The judicial takings example
shows that the unidirectional availability of appellate review could di-
minish the incentives of the parties to make their strongest legal argu-
ments, resulting in legal rules that are more likely to vacillate during
the pendency of a case. If all appellate cases result from appeals by
parties alleging that the lower courts have abrogated their existing en-
titlements-not from an equal mix of parties challenging the lower
courts' abrogations and refusals to abrogate entitlements-then erro-
neous determinations by reviewing courts that lower courts abrogated
existing rights are inevitable. The absence of deference to state
courts or of vigorous waiver doctrines would result in further skew.
This effect may be significant for owners that are situated similarly to
the party that is seeking to preserve its entitlement. In a world where
judicial takings remedies provide these parties with a second bite at
the apple, they have diminished incentives to file amicus briefs or in-
tervene in early stages of a proceeding. The strategy of waiting until
the state court appeals are fully resolved, and then raising judicial tak-
ings arguments that were not considered by the courts below, could
often constitute the optimal litigation strategy for a similarly situated
owner, albeit a strategy that imposes negative externalities on the
courts and those similarly situated. The second-order effect of asym-
metric appellate review would be decreased expenditures on legal rep-
resentation at the early stages of a case.
We can now bring the discussion full circle. Recall that in Part I
we suggested that it is appropriate to use the judicial takings frame-
175 SeeJonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-1623929.
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work to analyze cases in which the court intentionally changes a prop-
erty rule to appropriate private property to achieve some public goal.
This is significantly more likely to occur where the State is actually a
party to the action than when the case is simply a dispute between
private parties, though we concede that-as with the New Jersey beach
cases176-some private disputes may present opportunities for inten-
tional appropriations. But, importantly, our criticisms in this Part of
the asymmetric incentives created by judicial takings have been lim-
ited to those instances in which both parties to a dispute are nongov-
ernmental actors. The incentive to underinvest is substantially
diminished in cases involving governmental defendants for two rea-
sons. First, the government will be on the hook for any damages that
are ultimately awarded to property owners. Second, and perhaps less
obviously, state actors are likely to be repeat players in property litiga-
tion. Res judicata and stare decisis mean that a defendant who ex-
pects to have to confront many similarly situated landowners is likely
to invest appropriately in retaining high-quality legal counsel at every
stage in the legal proceedings, regardless of whether the possibility for
bringing a judicial takings suit exists. Governments have enough at
stake to warrant the expenditures. To be sure, their lawyers may still
make costly mistakes-as Florida's lawyers did in their brief opposing
certiorari in Stop the Beach-but the clients will have the right sorts of
incentives to minimize these mistakes over the long run. 177 Because
nearly all governments will be repeat players in property litigation,
and only a few private actors will be, using divergent doctrines to deal
with the challenges of private-versus-public and private-versus-private
litigation provides a sound enough heuristic.
III
How TO DIFFERENTIATE TAKINGS AND DUE PROCESS, AND
WHY IT MATrERS
On the basis of our analysis in Parts I and II, we can now identify
several connected factors that can help courts decide when a claim
that the judiciary has curtailed an owner's private property rights
should be litigated under the Takings Clause and when it should be
litigated under the Due Process Clause. The following table summa-
rizes our argument:
176 See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
177 At the risk of stating the obvious, we do not attribute any mistakes made by lawyers
in Stop the Beach to the existence of a judicial takings doctrine because the federal courts
had not recognized ajudicial takings cause of action at the onset of litigation in that case.
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2601-02 (2010) (plurality opinion) (equating legislative and judicial takings to state tak-
ings through regulations).
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TABLE 1: DECIDING BETWEEN DUE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL TAKINGS
APPROACHES
Factors Warranting Judicial Takings Factors Warranting Due Process
Treatment Treatment
" Intent to appropriate property for * Absence of intent to appropriate
public use by the judiciary
" Presence of repeat-player, * Absence of repeat-player litigants,
governmental litigants mitigating creating underinvestment
underinvestment problem incentives
" Government retains the property * Government does not retain the
for a public use property, but court merely causes
* Coordinated effort between a private owner to lose it
judiciary and another branch * Self-dealing by the judiciary, with
judges as the direct or indirect
beneficiaries
These four basic factors-(1) intent to appropriate private property
for public use, (2) repeat play, (3) State retention of the property, and
(4) coordination-are the central questions that courts should con-
front in deciding whether it is appropriate to treat government con-
duct as a potential judicial taking. The factors stem from conceptual,
textual, structural, and pragmatic readings of the constitutional text,
and are largely congenial to existing precedents. Although there will
be (hard) cases in which the factors will point in different directions,
in the majority of cases we expect the factors to correlate strongly,
with the intent and benefit elements providing much of the connec-
tive tissue. Axiomatically, different government entities cannot coor-
dinate their actions unless they know what they are doing and intend
to act in concert. Where the government winds up with control over
an entitlement it previously lacked, it is likely to recognize the altera-
tion of the status quo. Inadequate legal research and poor framing of
the arguments by non-repeat-player litigants will make it more likely
that the judiciary unintentionally strips an owner of an existing entitle-
ment. We believe that these four factors present a workable standard
that can be used to guide courts in judicial takings and due process
cases going forward.
What are the implications of a claim being placed in the takings
box, as opposed to the due process box? Now we will work with a
contrasting list of threes, and we again can encapsulate the key distinc-
tions in a simple table. The first is that judicial takings claims will be
easier to win than due process claims. A judicial takings claimant
need only show that the government's act violates one of the existing
tests for determining whether a taking has occurred. A due process
claimant will, in most cases, have to show that the government's con-
duct does not withstand rational basis review or a similarly demanding
standard. This will be a tall order, though it can certainly be accom-
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plished in cases involving judicial self-dealing, needless losses imposed
on owners, or other forms of arbitrary action. Indeed, despite the low
reputation for success of due process claims against economic regula-
tion in federal court, state courts have shown a greater willingness to
strike down land-use regulations on due process grounds.1 78 In other
words, relegating a category of claims to a due process analysis is by no
means a death sentence for property owner's chances of success, espe-
cially in state court.
The second implication is that the remedy forjudicial takings will
ordinarily be damages, and the remedy for a due process violation will
be injunctive relief. The third implication flows from the second. In
judicial takings cases, a remedy adjustment along the lines of compar-
ative fault will be available to deal with lingering underinvestment in-
centives. In due process cases, the nature of the injunctive remedy
will preclude a comparative fault approach, though a less precise de-
fense analogous to contributory negligence may be available. 179
TABLE 2: IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL TAKINGS AND DUE
PROCESS APPROACHES
Implications of Judicial Takings Implications of Due Process
Treatment Treatment
* Relatively easy for the entitlement 0 Relatively difficult for the
holder to prevail entitlement holder to prevail
" Damages remedy * Injunctive remedy
" Comparative fault available to 0 Contributory negligence
address the (small) potentially available to address the
underinvestment problem (large) underinvestment problem
178 See, e.g., Twigg v. Cnty. of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Anderson v.
City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744, 751-55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
179 Other pertinent distinctions do arise, though they do not map onto the judicial-
takings-versus-due-process dichotomy. For example, the opportunities for legislative rever-
sal will differ between judicial takings cases and the two kinds of due process cases. More
precisely, both judicial takings cases and procedural-due-process cases will provide the rele-
vant legislature with an opportunity to accomplish the objective that the judiciary sought to
achieve, assuming the legislature shares the judiciary's goals. In other words, if the legisla-
ture feels that the judiciary appropriately abrogated existing property rights (say, in order
to maximize the community's welfare) it can pay the affected private property owners and
continue to enjoy the benefit of the new judicial rule. If, by contrast, it feels that the
judiciary was grabbing entitlements that ought to remain in private hands, then it can
restore the prelitigation status quo ante. This will limit the legislature's financial liability to
temporary damages that accrued between the time of the judicial decision that amounted
to a taking and the date on which the legislature restored the claimant's private property
rights. Similarly, in the procedural-due-process context, the legislature can always direct
the judiciary to enhance procedural protections for entitlement holders in a way that will
avoid running afoul of constitutional guarantees. In the substantive-due-process case, by
contrast, a constitutional violation will ordinarily preclude subsequent legislative efforts to
restore what the judiciary was trying to accomplish.
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A. Likelihood of Success
Having articulated those implications of treating the case one way
or another, let us now explore the intricacies of those implications in
more detail. We begin with the question of how likely a property
holder challenging a judicial decision is to prevail. Where an alleged
judicial taking does not transfer fee simple ownership from one owner
to another, evaluating the merits of the takings claim should proceed
under existing Supreme Court regulatory takings precedent. The Stop
the Beach plurality formulated its test for judicial takings as requiring,
as an initial matter, a change in state property law.'8 0 This require-
ment makes sense as a threshold requirement not just for judicial tak-
ings, but for regulatory takings in general.181
Where the activity regulated by the new rule is not a nuisance,8 2
the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York supplies the default test for resolving claims that the new
regulation amounts to a taking of private property.18 3 Indeed, in ear-
lier cases like PruneYard, the Supreme Court has applied the Penn Cen-
tral test to what were essentially judicial takings claims.18 4 Although it
has been extensively criticized in the academic commentary for its in-
determinacy, the Penn Central test has functioned in this role for over
three decades.18 5 Under the Penn Central approach, the mere fact that
a judicial decision changes the law in a way that burdens some part of
an owners' bundle of rights to accomplish a public use will not invaria-
bly support the conclusion that the court has "taken" the owner's
property without just compensation in violation of the Constitu-
tion.18 6 Instead, Penn Central instructs courts considering the impact
of the regulation on the parcel as a whole to weigh (1) the economic
impact of the regulation, which courts have often taken to mean the
impact of the regulation on the market value of the parcel; (2) the
degree to which the regulation interferes with owners' "investment-
backed expectations" for it, and (3) the character of the government
180 See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601-02 (plurality opinion).
181 See Doremus, supra note 44, at 3.
182 The Hadacheck per se rule tells us that where a court is acting to abate a nuisance,
the attendant restrictions on the property rights of the party that created the nuisance
should never amount to takings. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
183 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
184 Walston, supra note 29, at 427-28 (discussing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
185 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1701-02, 1711 (1988) (discussing the potential harm that an unpre-
dictable takings law standard could cause to investors and government officials).
186 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922))).
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action, such as the degree to which it singles out particular owners for
uniquely burdensome consequences.18 7
One aspect of the character of the government action that both
courts and commentators have found to be particularly salient is the
degree to which it singles out owners for uniquely burdensome conse-
quences. 188 As Saul Levmore has observed, "A central theme of tak-
ings law is that protection is offered against the possibility that
majorities may mistreat minorities."1 8 9 Government action that con-
centrates its costs on a small number of individual property owners
leaves those owners uniquely vulnerable to majoritarian abuse. 190 The
concept of the judicial taking interacts in potentially complicated ways
with this emphasis on "singling out." Because of the case-by-case na-
ture of judicial decision making, the argument might be made that
every judicial decision imposing a loss on an owner in some sense sin-
gles that owner out for adverse treatment. This would suggest that
judicial action might be especially likely to lead to successful Penn Cen-
tral regulatory takings claims or, perhaps, that judicial takings claims
should be treated in a categorically different way within a regulatory
takings analysis. If, as we argued above, 191 however, a judicial takings
claim only arises when courts change the law (as opposed to when
they merely apply existing law to the litigants before them), then judi-
cial takings do not appear to be different in kind from takings worked
by other branches of government from the standpoint of their likeli-
hood to single out. In assessing the degree to which a judicial rule
change singles out property owners for the purposes of applying the
third Penn Central factor, the nature and reach of the new rule of deci-
sion is the appropriate object of the "singling out" inquiry, as it would
be for any other state actor. That new rule can be very broad, or it can
be exceedingly narrow. The mere fact that it is a court that is making
the new rule should not itself be the decisive consideration.
In addition to the three-factor analysis laid out in Penn Central,
the Court has supplied a number of "per se" regulatory takings tests
that apply to narrow contexts. Where, for example, a State authorizes
187 Id.
188 See id. at 133; see alsoJohn E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1039 (2003) ("The problem of eminent domain is essentially one of
discriminatory taxation, which the government corrects through the provision of just com-
pensation."); Levmore, Just Compensation, supra note 130, at 306-07 (claiming that the "oc-
casional individual[ ]" or group rather than the traditional minority group is protected by
the Takings Clause because there would be no other political redress for that individual);
Pefialver, supra note 47, at 2223-28 (analyzing the differences between intentional and
accidental "singling out"); Treanor, supra note 55, at 866-80 (discussing process failure
and the Takings Clause).
189 Levmore, Just Compensation, supra note 130, at 309.
190 See id.
191 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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the permanent physical occupation of land-either by the govern-
ment or by a third party-for a public purpose, the Court's decision
in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. holds that per se a tak-
ing has occurred. 192 In the judicial takings context, this would mean
that the payment of just compensation is required where a judicial
decision that is appropriately characterized as a possible taking
changes the existing law of property to require an owner to endure
the permanent physical occupation of her land. In the past, the Court
has assumed that easement-like public access rights are equivalent to a
permanent physical occupation. 193 This suggests that, for example, a
judicial decision mandating public access to private property in order
to to accomplish a public end, such as the New Jersey Supreme
Court's line of beach-access decisions, would constitute a per se judi-
cial taking unless the decision were consistent with existing state-law
property principles (as the New Jersey beach-access decisions may
have been).
Another important "per se" rule the Court has adopted in the
regulatory takings context holds that, where a State permanently and
completely deprives an owner of the economically beneficial use of his
land, a taking has occurred.19 4 The exception, the Court said in Lu-
cas, is where the restriction on the owner's use of her property is con-
sistent with "background principles of the State's law," for example by
prohibiting the owner from creating a nuisance. 95 As with the other
regulatory takings doctrines, the Lucas test translates relatively easily
into the judicial takings context. The question simply becomes
whether a state-court decision deviates from background principles of
property law (such as the existing law of nuisance or zoning) and, if
so, whether it has the effect of permanently depriving an owner of all
economically beneficial use of his land. Where the answer to both of
these questions is yes, a judicial taking has occurred. 196
Where judicial takings analysis is inappropriate (e.g., because of
the absence of the requisite intent to appropriate), claims by owners
192 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
193 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
194 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); see also Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 303 (2002) ("[A] perma-
nent deprivation of the owner's use of the entire area is a taking of 'the parcel as a whole,'
whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in value is not. Logically,
a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic
use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.").
195 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
196 An interesting question in this context is whether the retroactive imposition of
monetary liability constitutes a taking of property, as a plurality of the Supreme Court
suggested in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532-37 (1998) (plurality opinion). If
that were the case, the judicial takings version of the Lucas rule might become extremely
broad, at least unless the judicial takings doctrine is properly cabined by correctly identify-
ing the boundaries of the takings-due process divide.
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complaining that a judicial decision has deprived them of property
should be evaluated using a due process analysis. As we discussed
above, the due process analysis includes both a procedural and a sub-
stantive component. 197 Procedurally, a property owner is entitled to
notice and an opportunity to be heard before losing her property.
The retroactive application of a rule to a party with a fully vested prop-
erty right implicates the notice element of procedural due process.
Although the owner does have an opportunity to be heard-in the
sense that someone has to initiate a judicial process to effectuate the
new rule-the inability of the owner to do anything to avoid her loss
constitutes a failure of notice in a way that implicates fundamental
conceptions of fairness. But this does not translate into a bright-line
rule that retroactivity in property law violates principles of procedural
due process.
In addition to its procedural protections favoring notice and an
opportunity to be heard, due process in its substantive dimension pro-
tects owners against arbitrary treatment at the hands of state actors.
Although they have not always kept regulatory takings and substantive
due process distinct, courts have normally understood the substantive-
due-process inquiry to involve an evaluation of the fit between the
means and ends. 198 In contrast, the takings inquiry is usually under-
stood to focus on the fairness of the burden a law imposes on a partic-
ular owner. 199 Where a court inadvertently imposes a loss on a
property owner by retroactively applying a new property rule, a sub-
stantive-due-process claim would argue that the decision of the court
not to apply the rule prospectively only is itself arbitrary. Although
the argument that a state action is arbitrary under the rational basis
test is usually thought to be virtually impossible for a claimant to
win,200 there are a number of reasons to think that it would not be a
futile argument to make when a property rule is applied retroactively.
For starters, these claims would all arise in situations in which the
owner's loss does not itself foster the State purpose animating the rule
change, otherwise the claim would be analyzed under the rubric of
judicial takings. And while there might be reasons a court would ar-
gue that it was rational nonetheless to apply a new rule retroactively-
largely due to questions of administrative convenience-those argu-
ments would carry less weight in the context of judicial takings, where
the fact of case-by-case adjudication substantially weakens the benefits
of retroactive rule application.
197 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
198 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
199 See id. at 540-42.
200 David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on the Practice and
Theory of Regulatory Takings, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 717, 750 (1999).
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Indeed, except where it would be difficult to determine when a
property interest was created, the case for the irrationality of retroac-
tivity seems very strong in property cases where the loss suffered by the
owner does not itself advance the policy behind the new rule. Be-
cause most interests in land are created through written, publicly re-
corded documents, proving when they are created is usually a
relatively straightforward task. But where it is hard to determine when
a property interest was formed, that difficulty can itself constitute a
reasonable basis for deciding to apply the rule retroactively (or, more
accurately, in all cases decided thereafter). Compared to real prop-
erty, interests in personal property are more likely to be created with-
out such contemporaneously recorded documentation. So, due
process should perhaps be more tolerant of retroactivity with respect
to personal property and less so where interests in real property are at
stake, where arguments against limiting a rule to prospective applica-
tion would be harder to justify. Even where it would be relatively easy
to determine when an item of personal property was acquired, pro-
spective application of a new rule may be more time consuming and
costly than universal application of the new rule. This might happen,
for example, where application of the new rule normally occurs
outside of an adjudicative process, such as with rules concerning in-
come taxation. As a result, we should not be surprised to see greater
tolerance of retroactivity in that context.201 Another situation in
which the presumption against retroactivity would not carry as much
weight is where it is clear that the parties to a particular transaction
did not alter their position in reliance on the old rule. In those situa-
tions, retroactive application of the rule does not do much to frustrate
the parties' expectations and courts seem more willing to apply the
new rule retroactively. 20 2
B. Procedural Questions
How would a property owner raise a judicial takings claim? For
the owner involved in the state-court litigation that arguably gives rise
to the judicial takings cause of action, one obvious course is to raise
the claim in the state-court proceeding itself. If the State were not
already a party to the action (a possibility, depending on the test be-
201 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 49 (1977); Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22
J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 266 (1993); Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule of
Prospectivity, 84 HARV. L. REV. 436, 436-37 (1970).
202 See, e.g., Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 262 (N.J. 1969) (applying a new adverse
possession "state of mind" requirement to the case before it because the parties were un-
likely to have relied on the old rule); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154,
162 (Wis. 1997) (applying a new rule permitting punitive damages without actual damages
in part because of lack of defendant's reliance on the old rule).
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ing used to determine the proper boundaries of the judicial takings
doctrine), there would need to be some mechanism for providing no-
tice to the State's attorneys. Raising the judicial takings claim might
be procedurally awkward in the earlier stages of litigation, particularly
where the judicial decision giving rise to the taking strikes like a bolt
from the blue. But motions for rehearing and, more obviously, the
appellate process provide procedural means for raising the judicial
takings argument.
A slightly trickier question arises for nonparty owners whose in-
terests are affected by judicial decisions. If a state court, for example,
has ruled that all beachfront property must be made open to the pub-
lic, this might work a judicial taking of the property of owners not
participating in the litigation in which the court announces the new
rule. The Supreme Court's decision in Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City requires takings
claimants to seek compensation through State-created procedural
mechanisms-including a state-court action for inverse condemna-
tion-before proceeding to federal court with an assertion that the
State has violated the Takings Clause. 20 3 Applying Williamson County
in the context of a judicial taking suggests that a nonparty owner who
believes she has been deprived of property by a state-court decision
must first seek compensation by filing an inverse condemnation ac-
tion in the state court. But where the compensation issue has already
been litigated in the state courts, such an inverse condemnation ac-
tion may well seem futile. Nevertheless, this futility in the judicial tak-
ings context does not seem to be different in kind from that faced by,
say, a property owner raising a nonjudicial regulatory takings claim
that is substantially similar to one that has already been litigated un-
successfully by another property owner. Consequently, the argument
for departing from existing procedural requirements for raising regu-
latory takings claims seems weak.
C. Comparative Fault and Contributory Negligence
Having already discussed the remedial implications of a determi-
nation that state action implicates the Takings Clause or Due Process
Clause, we can now say more about remedies. We have suggested that
the judicial takings framework is inappropriate in cases where the un-
derinvestment problem is significant. That said, because underinvest-
ment is one of four factors relevant to the judicial takings versus due
process inquiry, there may be disputes that present a real underinvest-
ment problem but nevertheless ought to be characterized as judicial
takings cases. Moreover, while the presence of a repeat player miti-
203 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985).
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gates the negative externalities associated with underinvestment in
high-quality legal representation, it does not eliminate it altogether.
To the extent that a free-rider problem persists, a comparative-fault
approach might make some sense in the judicial takings context. For
example, instead of losing a claim outright, an owner who has her
property taken for public use (in part) because of her own failure to
bring favorable relevant precedent to the court's attention might suf-
fer some percentage reduction in the just compensation ordered for a
successful judicial takings claim. Such a mechanism would operate
like a waiver doctrine, requiring owners to bring their judicial takings
claim to the courts' attention at the earliest point when courts are best
able to deal with the substantive legal and retroactivity questions. At
present, comparative fault is a concept quite foreign to takings juris-
prudence. But, until recently, the idea that a court could commit an
unconstitutional taking was largely foreign as well. The creation of
judicial takings liability presents several new legal challenges, and im-
porting comparative fault from tort law is a sensible approach to ad-
dressing a problem that does not really arise in traditional takings
cases, which do not depend on the property owner's own involvement
in the adversarial litigation process.20 4 To be sure, there may be some
concern that, if comparative fault were to find a foothold in judicial
takings law, it might be expanded to cover ordinary takings cases
where a well-connected constituent had failed to mount any political
resistance against a regulation that would wipe out the value of his
property, and this in turn could have pernicious consequences by en-
couraging landowners to take a scorched-earth approach to resisting
regulatory change. But the distinctive nature ofjudicial decision mak-
ing, with its reliance on litigants to educate the court about the legal
landscape, means that waiver-like doctrines such as the comparative-
fault scheme we are describing could appropriately be restricted to
the discrete domain of judicial takings.205
There is precedent both for approaching takings and due process
cases with an eye toward splitting the burdens of the regulation be-
tween the regulating entity and the regulated entity and for penaliz-
ing owners who negligently bring regulatory hardship upon
themselves. For example, most state courts hold that new land-use
204 A law review comment recently proposed a similar move in the context of compen-
sation for wrongful convictions, noting that several common-law countries had imported
comparative fault principles into their analysis of appropriate damages. See Adam I.
Kaplan, Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 56
UCLA L. REv. 227, 264-69 (2008).
205 We think the argument that comparative-fault principles should loom larger in tak-
ings cases more generally is worthy of further consideration, though we are not prepared
to take a position on that question here. For an article that develops this sort of approach
to regulatory takings, see Fee, supra note 188.
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regulations cannot be applied to existing uses without, at a minimum,
a "reasonable" amortization period that equitably balances the public
good generated by the regulation against the private burden imposed
on the regulated landowner.20 6 As with the due process cases more
generally, the courts in amortization cases seem to be aiming to
achieve a fit between the means and ends sought by the policy and the
private property owner's economic interests. 20 7 And, in land-use
cases, courts routinely treat self-created hardship by property owners
as a reason to allow regulators to impose heavier burdens on the
landowner. 208
In the due process context, where affected property owners have
had an opportunity to be heard, but share some blame for the applica-
tion of the new rule to their claim, the appropriate legal rule might
spread the costs between the government and owners whose own ac-
tions had contributed to the judicially imposed loss. One could imag-
ine a regime much like contributory negligence, operating at the
stage of determining whether there has been a violation of the Consti-
tution, not at the stage of what the damages should be for such a
violation. If a property owner had been involved in the proceedings
below, but failed to cite relevant precedents that made it clear to the
court that a decision adverse to them would abrogate an existing
property right, then her claim that the decision retroactively changing
the rule of property violated due process would fail. If, however, a
property owner with notice of a pending case had failed to intervene
while a court ruled against a similarly situated landowner, the argu-
ment that the owner is somehow at fault for the loss she has suffered
would be much weaker. Of course, contributory negligence's all-or-
nothing character is troubling. Takings cases, which necessarily in-
volve monetary damages and therefore lend themselves to fine-
grained approaches like comparative fault, provides judges with a
more comfortable margin for error.
D. So What Is a Judicial Taking? A Few Examples
Assuming that compensating parties for property losses imposed
by the judiciary is appropriate, we conclude that there is a category of
cases that should be treated as judicial takings. These cases involve a
judicial decision holding that a property right previously possessed by
206 See, e.g., Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 260-62 (N.Y. 1977).
207 See id.
208 The most common context in which this consideration arises is when homeowners
are seeking a variance from a zoning law that imposes a significant hardship on one of
their parcels. See, e.g., Bloom v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals; 658 A.2d 559 (Conn. 1995); Eas-
troads, L.L.C. v. Omaha Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 628 N.W.2d 677 (Neb. 2001); Shemo v.
Mayfield Heights, 722 N.E.2d 1018 (Ohio 2000); Sciacca v. Caruso, 769 A.2d 578 (R.I.
2001).
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a private property owner is now to be taken from the owner to serve
some public end. While we believe that the universe of judicial tak-
ings claims should be constrained, there are plenty of disputes that fit
the bill. Stop the Beach itself would have presented one such case. 209
Recall that the U.S. Supreme Court in Stop the Beach held that the
State, not the private property owners, possessed the right to the
newly filled beach under existing Florida law. 210 Had prior Florida
law pointed in the other direction, then the Takings Clause would
have been the appropriate tool for considering the constitutionality of
the state courts' conduct. As we have argued, applying the Takings
Clause to cases in which judicial action redefines property rights to
put what were previously private property rights to public use makes
good sense for a number of different reasons. If the Florida Supreme
Court had in fact changed its law of avulsion, Stop the Beach would have
had the profile of a classic takings case. In a hypothetical world where
the property owner had a clear entitlement, but the State proceeded
with the beach-filling project, the intentionality element would have
been satisfied: the judiciary would have been knowingly abrogating a
private property interest to serve the public interest. The courts
would have been the instrumentality by which the government de-
fendants in Stop the Beach took private property for public use, literally
redefining private property as state property. The case involved a
state-government repeat player as one of the litigants. That repeat
player had appropriate incentives to bring the pertinent precedents to
the court's attention, given the stakes in other land disputes in which
they may have been implicated. And, of course, the government de-
fendants in Stop the Beach became the owners of the land in question.
On the reading of the Fifth Amendment we proposed in Part I,
the State's action in this hypothetical situation looks more like a tak-
ing than a (due process) deprivation of property. The only missing
factor separating our modified Stop the Beach scenario from a paradig-
matic judicial taking would be the absence of obvious coordination
between the judiciary and another branch. But while the presence of
coordination strongly suggests that treating a state action as a poten-
tial judicial taking is appropriate, the opposite does not follow from
the absence of affirmative evidence of coordination. Counterfactu-
ally, had prior Florida law treated avulsions the same way it treated
accretions, the State's actions might well have amounted to a per se
judicial taking under Loretto.21I Having said that, it is plausible that
the State's action would have amounted to a taking that did not war-
209 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2611 (2010) (plurality opinion).
210 Id.
211 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-38 (1982).
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rant the payment of compensation, just as Jean Loretto herself evi-
dently received only one dollar in compensation on remand from the
Supreme Court.2 12 The best defense of Florida's beach renourish-
ment is that it was necessary to prevent the beachfront owners' houses
from eventually washing into the sea as a result of beach erosion.
Under such circumstances, the State's condemnation of the land for
the purposes of widening the beach may have left the property owners
better off than the alternative of state inaction. 21 3
The public-private boundary dispute we discussed at the begin-
ning of Part I is analytically similar to the issue in Stop the Beach. Part
I's not-so-hypothetical dispute between private parties over adverse
possession rules, by contrast, will most often implicate the Due Process
Clause. Even though the hypothetical arises in a situation where the
courts recognize that they are deviating from a previously controlling
precedent, the question of precisely which property owner prevails
(and which loses) under the new rule is almost certainly a matter of
indifference to the court. And so the intent to appropriate the prop-
erty for public use is lacking. The analysis would be different if the
new rule were enacted-and applied retroactively to vested claims-
precisely to reallocate property from one group (e.g., squatters) of
claimants to another (e.g., absentee owners). Moreover, the other
components of a paradigmatic judicial taking as we have described
them are missing. The litigants were not repeat players, which make
us worry about underinvestment and should diminish our confidence
in the extent to which the court made fully informed decisions about
the prevailing framework and the costs associated with departing from
the existing rule. The government never took control over the dis-
puted parcel of land, nor put it to a use appropriately characterized as
a public one at the conclusion of the litigation. The fact that the State
probably had some efficiency- or fairness-oriented purpose in chang-
ing its property doctrine tells us nothing about the ultimate use of the
land. And even if we were to assume that the change in the doctrine
will likely have the effect of transferring land from lower-value to
higher-value users across the large universe of cases, there would be
no grounds for reaching a particularized finding with respect to the
highest value use of the parcel at issue on the facts before the court.214
212 Loretto v. Group W. Cable, 522 N.Y.S.2d 543, 546 (App. Div. 1987).
213 See EPSTEIN, supra note 73, at 195-99 (discussing implicit in-kind compensation); 3
JULIus L. SACKMAN, NicHoLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8A.04[2] (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the
case law regarding severance damages, which incorporates principles of in-kind compensa-
tion for special benefits to landowners); LiorJ. Strahilevitz, Case Note, When the Taking Itself
Is Just Compensation, 107 YALE L.J. 1975, 1977-80 (1998) (discussing Sullivant v. City of
Oklahoma City, 940 P.2d 200 (Okla. 1997) and advocating a rule whereby actual private
benefits from a taking offset any just compensation that otherwise would be owed).
214 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use, 34 EcoLocv L.Q. 443, 448-54
(2007) (identifying legislative planning as a reason for judicial deference in takings cases);
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Finally, there was nothing to suggest a coordinated effort between the
judiciary and another branch. If the court were to apply the rule ret-
roactively to adverse possession claims that had already vested before
the new rule was announced, due process would be the better frame-
work for evaluating the constitutionality of the state court's action.
Other cases, even those not involving permanent physical occupa-
tions of private land by the State, provide further examples of disputes
that would be good candidates for analysis as judicial takings. Con-
sider, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions in Mat-
thews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,215 which we discussed above, and
Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.216 In Matthews,
the New Jersey high court expanded the reach of the public trust doc-
trine to require recreational public access to the dry sand areas of
certain privately owned beaches.21 7 In Atlantis Beach Club, it applied
its holding in Matthews to require the private beach club to allow
members of the public to make use of recreational use of its dry sand
beach without payment of the usual membership fee (though the
court did allow the club to charge members of the public a reasonable
fee to cover the cost of club services they enjoyed while using the
beach),218 Applying our theory of takings as purposeful appropria-
tion of private property for public use, cases like Matthews and Atlantis
Beach Club would seem to fall within the ambit of a judicial takings
analysis (though, again, that is not the same as saying that, given New
Jersey's background property law and the other considerations neces-
sary to find a Takings Clause violation, they would actually constitute
judicial takings).
CONCLUSION
This Article confronts the most serious and significant disputes
that arose in Stop the Beach, the Supreme Court's landmark judicial
takings case: the questions of when it makes sense to characterize a
judicial action as implicating the Takings Clause and what the appro-
priate remedies for such a taking might be. We find the approach of
neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Kennedy in Stop the Beach fully satisfy-
ing, and offer what we hope will be a better alternative. In our view,
the distinction between a violation of the Takings Clause and the Due
Process Clause depends on four interrelated factors: (1) the govern-
ment's intention to appropriate the property for a public purpose,
cf Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (finding that very extensive legis-
lative findings and planning were necessary to justify the use of the eminent domain power
for economic development purposes).
215 See 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
216 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
217 See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.
218 See Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d at 113.
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(2) the involvement of repeat players in the state-court proceedings
giving rise to the complaint about judicial appropriation, (3) whether
the government retains the property in question for a public use, and
(4) the existence of any coordination between the judiciary and an-
other branch. These factors stem from the convergence of textual,
conceptual, and consequentialist arguments about the nature of the
judicial power to adjust entitlements. Along the way, we develop a
functionalist answer to a question that has been lingering ominously
in the judicial takings debate since 1990-why should it matter which
branch of government reduces the value of private property? We sug-
gest that the nature of the adversarial process, and the pronounced
underinvestment problem that can result from compulsory judicial
takings insurance warrant significant restraint in identifying the
proper scope of a judicial takings doctrine.
The exercise of compensating property owners for judicial
changes in property doctrine remains controversial. Readers who are
hostile to the idea that the Constitution constrains this sort of judicial
conduct can understand our Article to be a theoretically ambitious
"second-best" effort to steer the case law in a more favorable direction.
When a car is careening off the road, it is better to have it crash into
the bushes than into a crowded caf6. Audiences more sympathetic to
the views of the six Justices in Stop the Beach who embraced the idea of
constitutionally limiting judges' ability to modify existing entitlements
should view our framework as a way forward, both for the courts that
will shape legal doctrine and for the scholars tasked with creating a
coherent fit between judicial takings and the rest of property theory.
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